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LIFTING LABOR’S VOICE:
A PRINCIPLED PATH TOWARD GREATER
WORKER VOICE AND POWER WITHIN
AMERICAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

Leo E. Strine, Jr.,* Aneil Kovvali** & Oluwatomi O. Williams***
In view of the decline in gain sharing by corporations with
American workers over the last forty years, advocates for American
workers have expressed growing interest in allowing workers to elect
representatives to corporate boards. Board level representation rights
have gained appeal because they are a highly visible part of
codetermination regimes that operate in several successful European
economies, including Germany’s, in which workers have fared better.
But board-level representation is just one part of the
comprehensive codetermination regulatory strategy as it is practiced
abroad. Without a coherent supporting framework that includes
representation from the ground up, as is provided for by works
councils in the European Union, representation from the top down
is unlikely to be successful. This Article begins the work of fleshing
out a principled and contextually-fitting approach to reform that
would allow for greater worker voice within the American corporate
structure. After establishing the basics of how codetermination
operates in the EU, the Article addresses the challenges facing even a
minimal codetermination regime in the United States, tackling issues
that reformers have not yet addressed. It then suggests a broader set
of reforms that would increase worker voice and improve worker
wellbeing now, while facilitating the eventual adoption of an effective
and efficient system of board-level representation for American
workers.
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INTRODUCTION
The dramatic decline in corporate gain sharing with American workers over
the last two generations has contributed to stagnating wages, soaring inequality, and
economic insecurity. There are global causes of greater inequality and depressed pay
that go beyond the decline in workers’ share. But many public policymakers and
economists believe that the reduced share of corporate profits that American workers
receive has been a major factor in the much larger increase in inequality that has
occurred in the United States, compared to its market economy allies in the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”). To some,
the explanation for the change in the division of the corporate pie is simple. During
this period, the power of the stock market over American companies has drastically
increased, while the leverage of working people in the corporate power structure has
drastically decreased, leading to stockholders grabbing much more of the pie, and
leaving workers with crumbs.1
These concerns have been deepened by the effect of the COVID-19
pandemic on working Americans, and the spotlight it has shined on the vast inequities
in our capitalist system. In the wake of the pandemic, there will be more calls for
giving employees more clout to advocate for better wages, safe working conditions,
an inclusive workplace that is free from harassment and discrimination, and fair
health and leave benefits. And leaders from both parties have come forward with
proposed remedies.2
As one remedy, leading public officials concerned for working people have
introduced legislation to provide workers with more voice within the corporate power

See, e.g., Anna Stansbury & Lawrence H. Summers, The Declining Worker Power
Hypothesis: An Explanation for the Recent Evolution of the American Economy, Nat’l
1

Bureau of Econ. Research (May 2020) (decline in workers’ share of economic profits in the
United States has been driven by decline in worker power at firms and the increase of firms’
responsiveness to the stock market as opposed to just factors like globalization); Joshua
Bivens, Lawrence Mishel & John Schmitt, It’s not just monopoly and monopsony: How
market power has affected American wages, Economic Policy Institute (Apr. 25, 2018),
https://www.epi.org/publication/its-not-just-monopoly-and-monopsony-how-market-powerhas-affected-american-wages/ (decline in worker power has driven decline in wages).
2

As part of his campaign, President Biden included worker-focused measures in his
“Build Back Better” plan. These steps included cracking down on labor law violations,
encouraging collective bargaining, and reinvigorating the National Labor Relations Board.

See The Biden Plan For Strengthening Worker Organizing, Collective Bargaining, and
Unions, Biden-Harris (Sep. 13, 2020), https://joebiden.com/empowerworkers/. A
conservative think tank, American Compass, issued a statement on labor reform signed by
Senator Marco Rubio among others. See Conservatives Should Ensure Workers a Seat at
the
Table,
American
Compass
(Sep.
6,
2020),
https://americancompass.org/essays/conservatives-should-ensure-workers-a-seat-at-thetable/. See infra Part I.
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structure.3 Our focus is their interest in a single element of an overall scheme of
economic organization known as “codetermination”: the element that has a
percentage of a company’s board of directors elected by the workforce. This element
may fairly be called “board codetermination.” It is in the “Reward Work Act” bill
introduced by Senator Tammy Baldwin 4 and the “Accountable Capitalism Act”
introduced by Senator Elizabeth Warren, 5 and it is supported by Senator Bernie
Sanders.6
They see board codetermination as a necessary reform to ensure greater
consideration of worker interests within all societally-important companies, both
private and public. This reflects a growing concern that relying on external reforms
such as reinvigorating the original promise of the National Labor Relations Act and
raising the minimum wage to a decent level closer to what is actually required for a
worker to live with some level of dignity and economic security is insufficient to
restore fair gain sharing with American workers.7 Thus, advocates for workers and

3

See infra Part I.

4

S. 2605, 115th Cong. (2018) (“Reward Work Act”). The bill was later reintroduced
as S. 915, 116th Cong. (2019).
5

S. 3348, 115th Cong. (2018) (“Accountable Capitalism Act”).

See Corporate Accountability and Democracy, BernieSanders.com (Oct. 14, 2019),
https://berniesanders.com/issues/corporate-accountability-and-democracy/.
6

7

It also reflects recognition that when legislatures have overcome corporate resistance
and taken action to protect corporate stakeholders, an active segment of the federal judiciary,
including a Supreme Court majority, has acted to undermine that legislative action. A
number of decisions have changed the balance of power between corporations and labor
interests in favor of business. E.g., Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., Council
31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) (striking down state law provisions allowing public sector unions
to collect dues solely for collective bargaining from nonmembers); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014) (holding that federal law protections for employee health
care coverage do not apply to corporations where controlling stockholders claim to have
contrary religious beliefs); Harris v. Quinn, 573 U.S. 616 (2014) (striking down state law
provisions allowing private sector unions to collect collective bargaining dues from
nonmembers); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011); AT&T Mobility v.
Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (holding that Federal Arbitration Act preempts state laws
barring arbitration provisions that do not allow class-wide arbitration); Citizens United v. Fed.
Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (striking down McCain-Feingold restrictions on
corporate political spending similar to ones that the Court already imposed on unions). The
Court has also rendered decisions disabling the government from protecting stakeholder
interests, and preventing less affluent individuals from having their voices heard in
government. See, e.g., Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) (striking down key
provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 that had recently been extended by Congress by
an overwhelming bipartisan vote); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012)
(striking down Obamacare provisions mandating Medicaid expansion); Sorrell v. IMS
Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011) (striking down state statute preventing the sale of
prescription information as a violation of First Amendment); Michael J. Klarman, Foreword:
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other stakeholders are demanding internal reforms via changes to corporate and
securities laws that would require corporations to give more weight to their interests.
We agree that conditions for working Americans need to improve. But, for
progress to be made, reality must be taken into account, and policies to give workers
more leverage must be feasible. Without that clear-eyed approach, caring
policymakers risk failing to reach their goal of restoring fair gain sharing with
American workers within our capitalist system, or even worse, distracting from
internal and external reforms that might be more achievable in our economic system
and thus might be more likely to create greater economic progress for workers.8
This approach is essential in considering how board level consideration
would work in the American system, because you cannot use an approach from social
democratic market-based economies in the United States on a plug and play basis.9

The Degradation of American Democracy—and the Court, 134 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (2020)
(providing a general treatment of the problem). Together, these decisions have related
effects that make it difficult for external regulation protecting stakeholders from corporate
overreaching to be effective: i) they make it more difficult to get legislation or regulations
protecting workers and other stakeholders adopted in the first place; and ii) they increase the
danger that the judicial branch will neuter those protections that run the approval gantlet
successfully. See generally, Leo E. Strine, Jr., Corporate Power Ratchet: The Courts’ Role
in Eroding “We the People’s” Ability to Constrain Our Corporate Creations, 51 Harv. C.R.C.L. L. Rev. 423 (2016); see also John C. Coates, IV, Corporate Speech & The First
Amendment: History, Data, and Implications, 30 Const. Commentary 223 (2015)
(illustrating how the Judiciary has allowed the First Amendment to be used by corporate
powers to invalidate regulations protecting consumers, society, and other stakeholders).
8

In fairness, the proponents of board codetermination do not seek it in isolation. For
example, both Senator Warren and Senator Baldwin support a number of other internal and
external reforms to give workers and other stakeholders greater protection. These include
measures to revitalize the NLRA, require greater disclosure of worker issues, and adopt a
living wage. Labor law academics have also noted the need for comprehensive reform
empowering workers. See, e.g., Matthew T. Bodie, Labor Interests and Corporate Power,
99 B.U. L. Rev. 1123 (2019).
Within corporate law academic circles, the debate seems stuck at an outdated place
that pits internal versus external reform as a binary choice, failing to recognize that
throughout the OECD, most of America’s most successful economic competitors have
corporate governance systems that require, as an internal matter, that the corporation focus
on stakeholders, particularly workers, and stronger external laws protecting union rights and
other important rights vital to workers. For examples of recent accounts tending toward this
unnuanced approach, see, Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, The Illusory Promise
of Stakeholder Governance, 106 Cornell L. Rev. 91 (2021); Matteo Gatti & Chrystin D.
Ondersma, Can a Broader Corporate Purpose Redress Inequality? The Stakeholder
Approach Chimera, 46 J. of Corp. L. 1 (2020).
9

The problems of making a foreign law arrangement work within our domestic
system parallels prior American experience. The National Labor Relations Act has failed to
fulfill its intended promise because comprehensive supporting reforms were never
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In this paper, we focus on the practical issues that must be addressed if board
codetermination is to be introduced in the United States. We do so with the
constructive goals of identifying the key issues that must be confronted if a form of
board codetermination were to be implemented effectively in the United States, and
identifying immediate steps that could help American workers and provide a viable
pathway to more effective worker voice in American corporations.
One central observation animates our discussion. In other nations that
practice codetermination, there is a coherent, legally required internal framework
within which management and labor must work together to govern companies in a
manner that benefits all stakeholders. That internal framework is supported by a
robust set of external laws that reinforce the need for corporations to treat workers
fairly and that provide additional support to workers that reduces inequality and
promotes economic security.
As a result, we identify some positive internal and external steps that could
be taken to rebalance our corporate governance system favorably toward workers and
environmentally responsible, sustainable growth. These include: a) requiring all large
corporations in the U.S., public or private, to respect the interests of all stakeholders,
including workers, and to focus on sustainable growth; b) authorizing and mandating
the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) to require Employee,
Environmental, Social, and Governance (“EESG”) disclosure from all large
companies and institutional investors; c) transforming board compensation
committees at all large companies into board workforce committees with a broader
responsibility to ensure fair pay and working conditions for all employees, not merely
select officers and directors, and to oversee policies on pay, workforce diversity,
equity, and inclusion, atmosphere, and safety, and corresponding disclosure
requirements; d) authorizing these workforce committees to institute European-style
works councils to increase worker voice and provide information to the board; e)
enacting labor law reform reinvigorating workers’ rights to join a union and
authorizing sectoral bargaining; and f) undertaking complementary reforms designed
to ensure that the institutional investors who collectively control public companies
behave in a manner aligned with the interests of the underlying human beings whose
capital they deploy.
To illuminate the challenges facing board codetermination in the U.S.
context and identify possible measures that could make it work more effectively, we

implemented (e.g., including strong labor protections in the global trading regime), and
because corporate influence on the political process has been used to render the NLRB
ineffective and to otherwise make it difficult for workers to organize and bargain. See, e.g.,
Leo E. Strine, Jr., Development on a Cracked Foundation: How the Incomplete Nature of
New Deal Labor Reform Presaged Its Ultimate Decline, 57 Harv. J. on Legis. 67 (2020);
Cynthia Estlund, Something Old, Something New: Governing the Workplace by Contract
Again, 28 Comp. Lab. L. & Pol’y J. 351, 357 (2007); Michael L. Wachter, Labor Unions: A
Corporatist Institution in a Competitive World, 155 U. Penn. L. Rev. 581 (2007).
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proceed as follows. In Part I, we identify the key current proposals in Congress to
adopt board codetermination. We accept these proposals as setting forth the scope
of codetermination sought by key elected officials who wish to increase worker voice
within the corporate structure.
In Part II, we explain how codetermination operates in key market-based
economies like Germany. Importantly, we explain that representation of worker
directors on the ultimate board of a company is only one aspect of codetermination
as it operates abroad. In other nations with board codetermination, top-down
representation is accompanied by ground-up worker representation through works
councils that work with management to make decisions about issues like employee
leave, terminations, working conditions, and relocation. Codetermination also exists
in nations where levels of unionization are higher than in the U.S., and where labor
unions play a supportive role to both worker representatives on works councils and
boards of directors. Put simply, codetermination elsewhere is a comprehensive
system that culminates, and does not begin, with board representation. As important,
codetermination elsewhere is accompanied by a corporate law that requires
stakeholder-focused governance, and that thus requires all directors, be they elected
by stockholders or workers, to advance the interests of all stakeholders and not just
stockholders.
From there, in Part III, we describe the issues that must be confronted to
implement a minimalist form of codetermination in the U.S. These issues include:
a) which workers would be eligible to vote for directors; b) who would be permitted
to serve as a worker director; c) how campaigns would be conducted; d) how elections
would be administered; and e) how a board with worker directors would function.
We call this “minimalist” because the proposals involve only board codetermination,
the aspect of codetermination that involves having worker elected representatives on
the board of directors.
In Part IV, we grapple with the broader issues that policymakers have to
address to make board codetermination function effectively in the United States. We
then surface policy initiatives that could be taken that would benefit American
workers now and that would be a useful pathway toward an eventual effective system
of board codetermination. If board codetermination legislation has more imminent
viability, these measures should be enacted simultaneously, to provide a framework
to better make board codetermination serve its intended purposes.
We then conclude.
I.

CONGRESSIONAL PROPOSALS FOR BOARD CODETERMINATION

In March 2018, Senator Tammy Baldwin of Wisconsin introduced the
Reward Work Act in the Senate. The bill was pitched as reining in stock buybacks
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and giving workers a seat at the table.10 This reflected the Senator’s concern that our
corporate governance system has reduced workers’ fair share of the economic pie
and put it on the plates of investors and top management.11 For our purposes, the
most important part of the Reward Work Act is the board codetermination
provision. That provision would prevent issuers from “register[ing] securities on a
national exchange unless at least 1/3 of the issuer’s directors are chosen by the issuing
company’s employees in a one-employee-one-vote election process.” 12 The SEC,
acting in consultation with the NLRB, would issue regulations providing for “fair and
democratic” elections of the worker representatives to public company boards.13
The Accountable Capitalism Act proposed by Senator Elizabeth Warren of
Massachusetts in August 2018 also called for board codetermination as one element
of a broad set of reforms. The Accountable Capitalism Act was presented as an effort
to stop large corporations from focusing primarily on shareholder returns and to
force them to consider the interests of a broader range of stakeholders. By way of
example, it would require corporations with over a billion dollars in gross receipts in
a taxable year to charter as a “United States corporation.” 14 The United States
corporation concept was modeled on Delaware’s public benefit corporation statute,
by requiring corporations to advance a public purpose and to have their directors
respect a broad range of stakeholder interests.15
The codetermination provision of the Act specified that “[n]ot less than 2/5
of the directors of a United States corporation shall be elected by the employees of
the United States corporation.”16 The SEC, acting in consultation with the NLRB,
would be directed to issue rules for the director elections to ensure that they would
be “fair and democratic,”17 and would share in enforcement responsibilities.18
We focus on the common elements of the Reward Work Act and the
Accountable Capitalism Act as exemplifying the framework sought by advocates of

U.S. Senator Tammy Baldwin Introduces Legislation to Rein in Stock Buybacks
and Give Workers a Seat at the Table (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.baldwin.senate.gov/press10

releases/reward-work-act.
11

Id.

12

Reward Work Act § 3(b).

13

Id. § 3(c).

14

Accountable Capitalism Act § 4.

15

Id. § 5. For a discussion of the public benefit corporation concept, see infra Part

IV.A.
16

Id. § 6(b)(1).

17

Id. § 6(a).

18

Id. § 6(c)(1).

LIFTING LABOR’S VOICE

9

board codetermination in the U.S. Congress. 19 These are: a) that a meaningful
percentage of the board should be comprised of directors elected by company
workers; b) that this requirement should apply to all large American companies, and
not just public companies, and be a uniform federal mandate; and c) that the election
system should be fair but the means for ensuring fairness and resolving a number of
key issues is left to administrative agencies to determine.20 This basic framework is
more rudimentary than exists in other nations committed to codetermination, and
leaves open important questions that must be answered for a system of board-level
codetermination to function fairly and effectively.
II.

A.

CODETERMINATION IN PRACTICE

Introduction

To analyze how an effective system of board codetermination would work in
the United States, it is critical to understand that the very notion of implementing
board codetermination in isolation is alien to the overall concept of codetermination
as it has been implemented in the nations that embrace it. Codetermination involves
a philosophical and practical commitment to the idea that managers and workers
should collaborate to adopt key corporate policies, make key decisions, and to shape
the company’s goals and culture.21

19

Other proposals include Senator Bernie Sanders’s “Corporate Accountability and
Democracy” plan, which included calling for workers to elect 45% of the seats on corporate
boards.
Corporate Accountability and Democracy (Oct. 14, 2019),
https://berniesanders.com/issues/corporate-accountability-and-democracy/. The proposal
also included provisions intended to increase worker ownership of corporate shares. Id.
The proposals all build on the Workplace Democracy Acts, which have been reintroduced
in numerous forms. Ewan McGaughey, Democracy in America at Work: The History of
Labor’s Vote in Corporate Governance, 42 Seattle U. L. Rev. 697, 699 (2019). These bills
have called for worker representation on pension plan boards, restoration of sectoral
bargaining, and protection against mischaracterizing employees as independent contractors.

Id.
20

This baseline is consistent with prior scholarly assumptions, particularly those made
by an eminent labor law scholar in his still relevant examination of codetermination’s fit with
the American economic system two generations ago. See Clyde W. Summers,
Codetermination in the United States: A Projection of Problems and Potentials, 4 J. Comp.
Corp. L. & Securities Reg. 155 (1982).
21

See, e.g., Co-Determination 2019, German Federal Ministry of Labour and Social

Affairs 5 (2019) (“Co-Determination 2019”) (“The works council and the employer should
co-operate on a basis of trust, in the interests of the employees and the establishment.”);
Rebecca Page, Co-determination in Germany – A Beginner’s Guide, Arbeitspapier, No. 313,
Hans Bockler-Stiftung 8 (2018) (“A modern economy needs a climate in which conflicts are
settled through dialogue and not by force. . . . Whether participating in company decisions
or contributing on company matters, the principle is the same in every case: co-
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As we will show, this commitment is not just reflected in a top down
representation of worker-elected representatives on the ultimate board of the
corporation. Instead, it is manifested in a comprehensive structure, from the ground
floor up to the C-Suite and boardroom, that gives workers a meaningful voice and
corresponding responsibility in decisions important not just to them, but in shaping
and implementing the company’s overall business strategy.
In particular, the board level of codetermination rests on the ground floor
foundation of codetermination, in the form of not only greater union prevalence, but
the right to works councils, comprised of workers and managers, and charged with
responsibilities over matters like employee hours, workplace rules, and workplace
safety.22 These works councils are a source of both qualified director candidates, and
information to help worker directors function effectively. Notably, the required
number of works councils required is set to ensure that all workers have meaningful
input on the issues that affect their specific workplaces.23 The implementation of

determination means co-responsibility. In works councils and supervisory boards the
employees, just like the employer, need to keep an eye on the long term development of the
company.”). Exploring the philosophical foundations of codetermination is beyond the
scope of this Article’s more practical aims. Three categories of arguments are commonly
discussed in the literature. First, codetermination schemes understand the corporation as a
social entity whose key stakeholders comprise of workers, and not just the investors and top
managers. See, e.g., Ewan McGaughey, The Codetermination Bargains: The History of
German Corporate and Labor Law, 23 Colum. J. of European L. 135, 138 (2016). Second,
codetermination recognizes that by giving the workers an important say in how the firm
makes it products or delivers it services, firms will improve productivity and quality. See, e.g.,
Stephen F. Befort, A New Voice for the Workplace: A Proposal for an American Works
Councils Act, 69 Mo. L. Rev. 607, 612 (2004) (“most [studies] find that employee
involvement generally enhances the economic productivity of the firm”); Finally,
codetermination recognizes that the political importance of large corporations in complex,
democratic societies and ensures that their internal governance mechanisms embody some
of the same qualities of representative democracy. See, e.g., McGaughey, Codetermination
Bargains, supra note 21 at 167-68 (describing reemergence of codetermination in Germany
after World War II as part of efforts by the United States to reconstruct democracy in
Germany and avoid a return to fascism); cf. Nikolas Bowie, Corporate Personhood v.
Corporate Statehood, 132 Harv. L. Rev. 2009 (2019) (describing concept of “industrial
democracy” in the United States); Befort, supra note 21 at 612-13 (“employee participation”
creates “democratic empowerment serves basic notions of human dignity and autonomy”
that “carry over . . . into larger social and political arenas in the community”). All three
concepts have played a role in the development and practice of codetermination. Broadly
speaking, each approach conceptualizes codetermination as part of a system of economic
regulation that recognizes the importance of worker contributions to the success of private
enterprises, and the importance of corporate decisions to the lives of workers and society as
a whole.
22

23

See infra Part II.B.

Section 4 of the German Works Constitution Act provides that a department or
office of an establishment is to be regarded as an independent establishment if it is a
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codetermination is also supported by specialized courts and administrative agencies
charged with assuring implementation of codetermination, and enforcing the rights
that codetermination laws give workers.24
Importantly, codetermination works in concert with an approach to corporate
governance that expects that boards of directors will not just respect stockholders’
need for a fair return, but also other corporate stakeholders, such as workers, the
company’s communities of operations, its consumers, and society as a whole.
Codetermination thus operates within a system of corporate law focused on balancing
the interests of all stakeholders, and that does not require boards to treat stockholder
welfare as the primary end of corporate governance.
To illustrate these contextual realities, we focus on the German system as our
major example.
Although Germany is the nation most associated with
codetermination,25 Germany’s system is consistent with the basic approach taken by
other nations who embrace codetermination. 26
As critical, aspects of
codetermination are common throughout the European Union and broader OECD
in nations that do not require representatives of workers to be on the board of
directors. In fact, the European Union has a directive on works councils that applies
to European multinationals and that addresses the ground-up component of
codetermination.27 As a result, in the EU, it is more common than not that large
companies, both public and private, must have a works council with strong employee

“considerable distance from the principal establishment,” or is “independent by reason of
their function and organization.” In that event, the independent establishment can choose
whether to have its own works council or participate in the works council of the principal
establishment. Id.

See Manfred Weiss, Dispute Resolution in German Employment and Labor Law,
34 Compl. Labor L. & Pol’y J. 793 (2013) (describing robust German labor court system for
resolving disputes involving workers’ rights).
24

25

Germany’s system of codetermination has organic roots and developed along
different lines than American labor law. See McGaughey, supra note 19. But after World
War II, United States administrators in Germany saw the reemergence of labor organizations
as a positive development that would help restore democratic ideals and counteract fascist
tendencies in German industry. Id. at 164-65.
Aline Conchon & Jeremy Waddington, Board-level employee representation in
Europe: challenging commonplace prejudices, in The Sustainable Company: a new
approach to corporate governance, 91, Tb. 1, 94-95 (Sigurt Vitols & Norbert Kluge eds.,
2011) (18 EU nations have some form of board codetermination).
26

27

See E.U. Council of Ministers Directive 94/45, 1994 O.J. (L 254) 64 (requiring

companies with over 1,000 employees in the E.U. and 150 employees in each of two or more
E.U. member states to have a works council structure).
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membership and having authority over matters relevant to workers, such as safety,
work schedules, terminations, transfers, and staffing levels.28
Because the focus of the proposals for board codetermination in the United
States is on large companies that are publicly listed or with revenues of over one
billion dollars, we concentrate on how the German system applies to companies of
that kind. Thus, in Part II.B, we describe the operation of works councils in
Germany, and in other nations with codetermination. We highlight the critical role
that unions play in codetermination, while underscoring that even when there is no
union, works councils exist to give workers voice and leverage. In Part II.C, we
discuss how board codetermination builds on this ground-level foundation. In doing
so, we address: a) what workers are eligible to vote—in particular, whether only
domestic workers or all workers get to vote; b) what percentage of the board is elected
by workers; c) what percentage of worker directors are comprised of middle manager
representatives and what percentage is allocated to line workers; d) how elections are
conducted, how often, and how disputes are regulated; and e) what the duties of
worker directors are, including how they are compensated and balance their time
with their regular work duties. Then, in Parts II.D and II.E, we situate
codetermination within the overall corporate governance and economic systems of
their nations, taking into account issues like the ends of corporate law and approaches
to competition such as sectoral bargaining, all of which can enhance the effectiveness
of codetermination. In this Article, we use the term “worker director” for ease of
expression and because in the German system that is the most like what U.S.
advocates of board codetermination seem to emulate, workers themselves are elected
to represent other employees on boards.

B.

Establishment Level Codetermination

Board codetermination, which operates on the overall company level, is only
one part of the system of codetermination. Codetermination also operates at the socalled “establishment” level, which addresses decisions made within a given factory,
shop, or warehouse.29 Although so-called “company” level codetermination happens
through worker representation in the boardroom, establishment level
codetermination happens through works councils, which are empowered to obtain
information, share in managerial decision-making authority, and speak on behalf of

28

Id.

See Betriebsverfassungsgesetz, Jan. 15, 1952, BGBI I at 13 (“German Works
Constitution Act”) § 1(1) (“Works councils shall be elected in all establishments that
normally have five or more permanent employees with voting rights, including three who are
eligible.”); Co-Determination 2019, supra note 21 at 4 (“Worker participation takes place at
two levels: at the level of the establishment as the place where operational purposes are
pursued (production, marketing, administration, services) and at the level of the company as
the corporate entity . . . .).
29
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workers on various matters.30 Works councils work cooperatively with employers,
employers’ associations, and trade unions to advance the interests of both companies
and their employees.31
As discussed, we concentrate on the requirements for large companies, akin
to those targeted by Senator Warren’s Accountable Capitalism Act. The large
companies we are concerned with are likely to have many establishments—e.g.,
factories, shops, and warehouses—and, as a default, the workers at each establishment
would be empowered to elect their own works council. 32 The framework for
representation at such companies can be set through a collective or works agreement
struck between the company and existing works councils, which might provide for a
uniform works council for the whole company or consolidation of establishments for
representation purposes.33 If multiple works councils remain at a given company,
their efforts will be coordinated through a central works council.34
A German works council has the right to receive certain information, to veto
certain actions, and to negotiate with management on specific matters. 35 A works
council has a right to codetermination in matters including:


increases in working hours;



holiday schedules;



performance monitoring;



accident prevention; and



performance-based compensation.36

30

See, e.g., Co-Determination 2019, supra note 21 at 7.

31

German Works Constitution Act § 2(1).

32

For example, if human resources decisions are made at each individual store, each
individual store might be deemed an establishment which would be statutorily eligible for its
own works council. The resulting representative structure would match the company’s
decision-making structure.
33

German Works Constitution Act §§ 3(1)(1)(a)-(b).

34

Id. § 47.

E.g., German Works Constitution Act §§ 80, 85, 87, 90-91, 99, 102; Page, supra
note 21 at 13-17.
35

36

German Works Constitution Act § 87.
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To transfer or terminate employees, employers are required to obtain either the
works council’s consent or an order from the labor courts.37
The works councils also have powers in the event of important corporate
actions. For example, if a business unit is acquired or set to be shut down, the works
council is empowered to negotiate a “social plan” (Sozialplan) that is intended to
mitigate any harm to workers.38
German works councils also have the power and obligation to help manage
the business. To that end, works councils can appoint an economic or finance
committee (Wirtschaftsausschuss) to consult with the employer on matters like the
economic and financial situation of the company, production and investment plans,
rationalization plans, and takeovers.39
This involvement in management extends to key human resources issues.
Works councils must present workers’ grievances to the employer, to the extent they
are justified.40 They also must see that laws, regulations, and collective agreements
are followed; make recommendations to benefit the establishment; and address
equality issues relating to gender, age, family status, and disability status.41 German
works councils may also remove employees who engage in unlawful, racist, or
xenophobic activities.42
Employees on works councils do not receive additional pay, but they are
entitled to their regular wages for time spent on works council meetings.43 Employers
are required not to retaliate against them or engage in favoritism toward them.44
Members of the works council are elected every four years by employees at
the establishment above the age of 18. 45 Four-year terms provide stability, allow
worker representatives to invest in developing expertise, allow worker representatives
to build a meaningful track record between elections, and reduce the cost of the

Id. §§ 99, 102. Workers also enjoy protection against at-will termination. See Jens
Dammann & Horst Eidenmüller, Codetermination: A Poor Fit for U.S. Corporations, 3
37

Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 870, 904-05 (2021).
38

German Works Constitution Act §§ 111, 112, 112a.

39

Id. § 106.

40

Id. § 85.

41

Id. §§ 75, 80.

42

Id. § 104.

43

Id. § 44(1).

44

Id. § 78.

45

Id. §§ 7, 13.
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election process. 46 The vote is by secret ballot, based on proportional
representation.47 The vote is supervised by an electoral board appointed by the works
council before the end of its term,48 and can be challenged in court.49
There are extensive relationships between German works councils and
unions. Trade union delegates may participate in works council meetings in an
advisory capacity.50 At companies with unions, a majority of works council members
are union members. 51 Although there is no formal requirement that unions and
works councils coordinate positions at companies with unionized workforces, in
practice unions have worked to achieve alignment.52
But there are important differences between the roles of unions and works
councils. The unions tackle issues like wage and benefit bargaining that involve more
give and take, and that present more potential for conflict between the demands of
other stakeholders, in particular the stockholders. By contrast, the works councils
address functional issues at specific business sites, including daily working hours and
breaks, performance monitoring, bonuses, handling group workflows, and
dismissals,53 while being barred from adversarial topics like wages and strategies like
strikes.54 Because these issues also affect the productivity and viability of the specific
business site, the workers involved have a personal interest in ensuring that their site
contributes positively to the company’s bottom line. Otherwise, the workers reduce

46

There have been proposals to shift American corporate governance away from
annual elections for similar reasons. See, e.g., Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A
New System of Corporate Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 187 (1991). But the trend has been strongly in the opposite direction, away from
staggered boards and toward annual elections of all directors. See Yakov Amihud, Markus
Schmid & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Settling the Staggered Board Debate, 166 U. Pa. L.
1475, 1485 (2018) (documenting this trend).
47

German Works Constitution Act § 14, 21.

48

Id. §§ 16, 18.

49

Id. § 19.

50

Id. §§ 31, 46.

Page, supra note 21 at 12 (“[B]etween 80-95% of WC members are members of
trade unions affiliated to the German Trade Union Confederation (Deutscher
Gewerkschaftsbund). The trade unions are therefore not represented in their own right on
the WCs but instead indirectly through their members who serve on them.”). Works council
members’ right to participate in a union is protected by statute. German Works Constitution
Act § 74(3).
51

Janice R. Bellace, The Role of the Law in Supporting Cooperative Employee
Representation Systems, 15 Comp. Lab. L.J. 441, 444 (1994).
52

53

German Works Constitution Act §§ 87, 102 (2001).

54

German Works Constitution Act § 74(2) (2001); Befort, supra note 21 at 640-41.
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their chances for continued employment, promotion and other opportunities to
improve their position. The works councils must accept responsibility for site-level
governance and cannot simply blame the management. That is the essence of
codetermination, in which decision-making is a shared function of the managers and
employees, working together to create a productive, safe, and fair workplace.
This represents a major distinction between codetermination and the
philosophy of American labor law. Instead of engaging workers collaboratively in
the running of businesses, American labor law seeks to maintain an adversarial
separation between labor and management. Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA prohibits
company-dominated labor organizations, arguably preventing the introduction of
bodies like works councils by employers themselves.55 The historical justification for
this is that many American corporations vehemently imposed unions, and used
company-dominated worker organizations to impede the ability of their workers to
act collectively or choose a union that was truly representative of them and
independent of management.56 For this and other reasons unique to the American
context, adversarial bargaining rather than cooperation characterizes American labor
relations, and there are limits the scope of issues bargaining can address. Thus,
managers are not required to bargain with unions on a wide variety of subjects that
are seen as important to entrepreneurial control over the enterprise, including plant
closings and product advertising.57 Although workers may have a profound stake in,
and well-informed views and about, those issues, the American system does not
recognize any right to worker voice on those topics.58

55

National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) § 8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (“It shall be
an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . to dominate or interfere with the formation or
administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it”).

E.g., N.L.R.B. v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 303 U.S. 261, 266 (1938)
(“maintenance of a ‘company union,’ dominated by the employer, may be a ready and
effective means of obstructing self-organization of employees and their choice of their own
representatives for the purpose of collective bargaining”); Ewan McGaughey, Democracy in
America at Work: the History of Labor’s Vote in Corporate Governance. 42 Seattle U. L.
Rev. 697, 721 (2019) (NLRA sponsor Sen. “Wagner had urged publicly that sham unions
should be suppressed because otherwise employers would sit ‘on both sides of the table’ or
pull ‘the strings behind the spokesmen.’”); Michael H. LeRoy, Employee Participation in
the New Millennium: Redefining a Labor Organization under Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA,
72 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1651, 1661 (1999) (before the NLRA, the “focus of employee participation
shifted from creating positive social and psychological conditions for workers to forming
sham unions” that would discourage actual unionization).
56

Befort, supra note 21 at 615 nn. 55-57 (NLRA does not require bargaining as to
“matters that go to the core of an employer’s entrepreneurial control such as plant closings
and product advertising,” and collecting sources).
57

See Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964) (Stewart,
J., concurring) (There are “areas where decisions by management may quite clearly imperil
job security, or indeed terminate employment entirely. . . . Nothing the Court holds today
58
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German unions play a key role in making works councils effective and
supplementing their role by addressing direct bargaining issues the works councils do
not. Although it has been declining since reunification, Germany’s unionization rate
(17.6% in 2015) remains substantially higher than the unionization rate in the United
States (10.6% in 2015).59 And German unions continue to have the size and power
to influence wage rates because of their density and another feature of German labor
law, sectoral bargaining, which amplifies the actual influence of unions over wages
and other issues relevant for German workers.
German sectoral bargaining involves negotiation between unions and
employers at an industry level on issues like pay rates and increases. Though there
has been a trend toward greater flexibility of terms for individual firms, the
agreements cover a broad swathe of German workers.60 By standardizing wages and
other provisions that will be applied by all firms operating in that sector of the
German economy, sectoral bargaining encourages firms to compete less by
minimizing wages, and more by maximizing productivity and innovation. 61 The
sectoral agreements negotiated by unions apply to non-members and to firms without
unions, so that German union membership numbers understate union influence.62

should be understood as imposing a duty to bargain collectively regarding such managerial
decisions, which lie at the core of entrepreneurial control. Decisions concerning the
commitment of investment capital and the basic scope of the enterprise are not in themselves
primarily about conditions of employment, though the effect of the decision may be
necessarily to terminate employment.”).
59

Trade Union, Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (data
extracted Aug. 1, 2020), https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=TUD. Sweden and
Denmark have substantially higher rates, with approximately two-thirds of private sector
workers unionized. Id.

See Lionel Fulton, Codetermination in Germany, Institute for codetermination and
corporate governance (July 2020) at 10 (sectoral agreements cover 49% of western German
employees and 35% of eastern German employees in workplaces with five or more
employees).
60

61

Several Democratic candidates for the presidency in the 2020 cycle supported
sectoral bargaining policies. See Alexandria Fernandez Campbell, The boldest and weakest
labor platforms of the 2020 Democratic primary, Vox (Oct. 29, 2019),
https://www.vox.com/2019/9/5/20847614/democratic-debate-candidate-labor-platforms.
President Joe Biden committed to a cabinet-level working group on labor issues, including
“explor[ing] the expansion of sectoral bargaining.” The Biden Plan for Strengthening
Worker Organizing, Collective Bargaining, and Unions, Biden-Harris (accessed Nov. 20,
2020), https://joebiden.com/empowerworkers/.
Bellace, supra note 52 at 444. There are important caveats: sectoral bargains do
not need to be accepted by every firm, and even firms that accept can be granted exemptions.
See Christian Dustmann, et al., From Sick Man of Europe to Economic Superstar:
Germany’s Resurgent Economy, 28 J. of Econ. Perspectives 167, 177-78 (2014) ( “[U]nion
contracts cover only the workers in firms that recognize the relevant sectoral wage bargaining
62
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In addition to these functional roles, works councils and unions serve as an
important source of candidates for worker board seats. Although there are
exceptions, worker “board members are for the most part works councilors and trade
union members.”63 Apart from the organizational backing and relationships afforded
by membership on a works council or union, the experience is useful to effective
service on a supervisory board.64

C.

Board Codetermination

As we have begun to explain, board codetermination facilitates and relies on
establishment level codetermination. Isolated workers are not just thrust as a
minority faction on to the board of directors of the company. Rather, the worker
directors are at the apex of a system of worker involvement in company management,
a system that operates ground up and top down. 65 In other words, although the
worker directors on the board have less power than the majority elected by
stockholders, 66 their influence remains important because it is buttressed by the
strong rights given to workers under the establishment level aspects of

(union) contract—regardless of whether the worker is a union member . . . . Also, German
firms that once recognized the union contracts can later opt out at their own discretion. Even
within union contracts negotiated at the industry level, there is scope for wage flexibility at
the firm level through so-called ‘opening’ or ‘hardship’ clauses, provided that workers’
representatives agree.”). Acceptance of German sectoral agreements varies by sector and
geography, and has declined over time. See id. at 178 (describing variation across tradable
services, manufacturing, and nontradables, and noting decline over time); Fulton, supra note
60 at 10 (there has been “a fall in the coverage of collective agreements” and describing
variation). But sectoral bargains still plays a large role in setting industry-wide pay and
working conditions. See Fulton, supra note 60 at 10 (“collective bargaining at industry level
between individual trade unions and employers’ organisations is still the central arena for
negotiating pay and conditions in Germany”).
63

Page, supra note 21 at 30.

64

For an interesting discussion of the debate over whether works councils improve
productivity, worker safety and fulfillment, see Jan Cremers, Management and worker
involvement: cat and mouse or win-win?, in The Sustainable Company: a new approach to
corporate governance, 75-90 (Sigurt Vitols & Norbert Kluge eds., 2011).
65

66

See supra Section II.B.

Viet D. Dinh, Codetermination and Corporate Governance in a Multinational
Business Enterprise, 24 J. Corp. L. 975, 981 (1999) (“Despite the even distribution of
supervisory board members between employee and shareholder representatives,
shareholder interests hold a slight advantage. The chairman is selected by a two-thirds
majority of the board, or by the shareholder representatives should such a supermajority not
be attained. The chair is given two votes in case of a tie on any question”).
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codetermination, and by a constant flow of information in both directions between
works council members to worker directors.67
To show how this operates in practice, we explain first the important issue of
what workers are eligible to vote for and seek a seat as a worker director, including
whether workers outside the nation of incorporation can participate. Beyond bare
eligibility, we discuss how the works council system, along with the greater prevalence
of unions, provides a natural source of qualified candidates for the board, who have
been seasoned by their experience participating in important management decisions
at the ground floor level. In covering these issues, we also discuss the right of middle
managers to representation.
From there, we talk about the mechanics of the election process, how
campaigns are funded, how they are regulated, and how long elected members
typically serve.
Finally, we address the nitty gritty of how board codetermination works in
Europe. This covers mundane, but in fact quite important, issues like director
compensation and the time worker directors get to spend. And it also involves a
focus on the role of European boards in comparison to U.S. boards, and the duties
imposed upon them by company law.

1. Eligible Voters
In nations with board codetermination, worker directors are typically
appointed in one of two ways: elected by the employees or nominated directly to the
board by unions.68 Where employees elect the board representatives, a regulatory
scheme sets forth the standards for voter eligibility.

See Hwa-Jin Kim, Markets, Financial Institutions, and Corporate Governance:
Perspectives from Germany, 26 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 371, 401 (1995) (“Under German
law, up to half of the seats on the supervisory board must be occupied by labor and worker
directors. In addition, German corporations normally have workers’ council (Betriebstrat)
and an economic committee (Wirtschaftsausschuss), which have extensive information and
partial approval rights. In this system, shareholder control is significantly limited.” (citation
omitted)).
67

68

In most codetermination systems, the worker directors are elected by employee
vote. See, e.g., Gesetz Uber die Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer (Mitbestimmungsgesetz)
[German Co-determination Act], May 4, 1976, BGBL I, 1976 German Co-determination
Act § 10(2). In the Nordic countries, however, the unions often have the right to direct
appointment. See, e.g., Swedish Act on Board Representation for Employees in Private
Enterprise, SFS 1987:1245 (1987) § 4. See also Aline Conchon, Board-level Employee
Representation Rights in Europe – Facts and Trends 15 (ETUI aisbl, Brussels 2011) (“[I]n
general, there are two ways of appointing worker directors in boardrooms. They can be
nominated directed by trade unions or must be elected by the entire workforce.”).
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Specifically, under German codetermination laws, all employees 18 and
older are entitled to vote for worker directors on both the works councils 69 and the
supervisory board. 70 The statute defines “employees” to include wage earners,
salaried employees, and executive staff, other than certain top managers. 71
Temporary employees are also entitled to a vote, if it is expected that they will work
for the company for over three months.72
Generally, only domestic employees may vote, and they may vote regardless
of their citizenship. 73 A Germany-based employee, immigrant or otherwise, is an
eligible voter. 74 But German codetermination does not extend to employees of
foreign branches or subsidiaries employed outside of Germany, German national or
not. That is, in German companies, an employee can vote if and only if they are

69

German Works Constitution Act § 7.

70

1976 German Co-determination Act § 10(2). In some nations, an administration
agency sets the eligibility rules. E.g., Danish Companies Act § 141; BEK nr 344 af
30/03/2012 (Gældende) (regulation setting voting age at 15).
71

German Works Constitution Act § 5(1)-(3).

72

Id. at § 7.

73

1976 German Co-determination Act § 10; Arbeitsverfassungsgesetz, ArbVG
(Austria); Act No 77/1997 Coll., on state enterprises (Czech Republic), France, Act VI of
1988 on Business Associations (Hungary), Luxembourg Act of May 6, 1974 , Netherlands
Act of May 6, 1971 (S 289) . The EU has not intervened to institute board codetermination
at the European level, as it has done to ensure that workers employed by large, multi-national
corporations are represented by European Works Councils. E.U. Council of Ministers
Directive 94/45, 1994 O.J. (L 254) 64.
74

1976 German Co-determination Act § 10 (no nationality requirement for eligible
voters but only domestically employed workers vote). See also Dammann & Eidenmüller,
supra note 37 at 13 n.37 (“Only German employees can stand for election, and only German
employees have right to vote… ”); Martin Hopner & Manfred Weiss, Co-determination
Under Threat: Block Social Europe, Social Europe (Jan. 12, 2017),
https://www.socialeurope.eu/co-determination-threat-blocking-social-europe
(“Any
employee who works for a company on German soil, whatever his or her nationality, can
vote and stand as a candidate in the supervisory board elections.”).
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75
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This is typical of European nations with board

This is a big issue for American policy makers to confront in a globalized
world, and none of the pending bills in Congress deal with it. At many American
corporations, the international workforce exceeds the domestic workforce.78 If these
workers are excluded, they would be rendered less equal than their American
counterparts. But if they are included, a move intended to improve the economic
security of American workers could be in tension with that and companies could find
themselves under pressure to offshore even more jobs. Reciprocity would also be an
issue. EU companies, including ones from Germany, have not extended the same
consideration to American workers who wish to unionize or use their voice, as they
must to their domestic and EU workforce.79
77

75

One nation, Denmark, takes a distinctive approach and allows foreign employees
working within the EU only to vote for a segment of the board, if stockholders approve.
Danish Company Act §§ 140–142. Denmark’s distinctive approach may be explained by its
former trouble convincing employees to opt in to the board codetermination system. See
Board-level Employee Representation in Europe, Eurofound (Sept. 27, 1998)
https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/fr/publications/report/1998/board-level-employeerepresentation-in-europe (“in Denmark, it seems hard - despite trade union awareness
campaigns - to raise interest and to persuade more employees to use their right to boardlevel employee representation.”). But see Herman Knudsen, Danish board-level
representation under revision, 14 Transfer: Eur. Rev. Lab. & Res. 141, 142 (2008) (arguing
that the change was not caused by the low rate of invocation of codetermination systems at
Danish companies but rather an agreed upon approach by all labor relations and corporate
stakeholders involved).
76

Id.

77

See infra Part II.A.

See Vanessa Fuhrmans, Big U.S. Companies Reveal How Much They Rely on
Overseas Workers, Wall St. J., Apr. 11, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/big-u-s78

companies-reveal-how-much-they-rely-on-overseas-workers-1523448000 (companies such as
General Electric, United Technologies, Ford, Honeywell, Whirlpool and others employed
at least twice as many foreign workers as domestic workers). In 2018, U.S. multinational
enterprises employed 43 million workers total, 28.6 million of which were domestic workers
and 14.4 million of whom were foreign workers. Activities of U.S. Multinational Enterprises,
2018, Bureau Econ. Analysis (Aug. 21, 2020), https://www.bea.gov/news/2020/activities-usmultinational-enterprises-2018.
79

Volkswagen has been embroiled for many years in a battle with United Automobile
Workers and many of its own workers at the Volkswagen Chattanooga, Tennessee plant.
The UAW has led attempts to unionize and, after doing so, leverage the European model
works councils. These attempts have been rebuffed by local political leaders and
Volkswagen itself. See Stephen J. Silvia, Organizing German Automobile Plants in the USA:
An Assessment of the United Auto Workers’ Efforts to Organize German-owned
Automobile Plants (Hans-Böckler-Stiftung 2016); Noam Scheiber, Volkswagen Factory
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2. Making a Place for Middle Management
Where employees are entitled to vote for worker directors on the board, the
specific statutory or regulatory definition of “employees” is important. Among other
things, this definition determines whether and how non-C-suite managers play a part
in elections for worker directors on the board. For example, the German
codetermination statute distinguishes between “executive staff” and top-level
management. 80 The former group can both vote for and seek election to the
employee elected director seats. Indeed, under German codetermination law, large
German companies must reserve at least one worker seat for an executive staff
member.81 Top-level management, or “members of the organs,” however, are not
eligible to vote for or seek election to a worker seat on the board.82
In according these rights to middle managers, EU nations again take an
approach different than the U.S. Under U.S. labor law, a sprawling number of socalled management employees, who are not at all near the top of the corporate ladder
and who have interests on which a union could be helpful, are denied the ability to
collectively bargain.83

Workers

in Tennessee Reject Union, N.Y. Times, June 14, 2019,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/14/business/economy/volkswagen-chattanooga-uawunion.html.
80

German Works Constitution Act § 5(1)-(3) (Executive staff are employees who are:
(1) empowered to hire and fire employees; (2) endowed with power of procuration or full
power of representation or power to sign; and (3) authorized to use discretion to carry out
duties that are important for the existence and development of the company).
1976 German Co-Determination Act § 15(1); Dammann & Eidenmüller, supra
note 37 at 14 (citing 1976 Codetermination Act § 11(2)) (“[I]t is worth noting that the German
Codetermination Act does not treat employees as a monolithic group. Rather, at least one
of the workers’ representatives must be a managerial employee.”). The senior management
candidates for seats on the board are nominated by senior management andelected by all
eligible voters. 1976 German Co-Determination Act § 10.
81

Id. at § 5(2).see also BEK nr 344 af 30/03/2012 (Gældende) (similar Danish rule
restricting top management from eligibility to be a worker directors).
82

83

NLRA Section 152(11) (defining supervisor as “any individual having authority, in
the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge,
assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their
grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the
exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use
of independent judgment.”). Because of corporate opposition, efforts to update the NLRA
to give rights to middle managers have not passed both Houses. See, e.g., Protecting the
Right to Organize Act of 2019, H.R. 2474, 116th Cong. (2019) (narrowing the definition of
“supervisor”); Protecting the Right to Organize Act of 2019, S. 1306, 116th Cong. (2019); Eli
Rosenberg, Congress’s most ambitious attempt to strengthen unions in years is set for a
House
vote
next
week,
Wash.
Post,
Jan.
29,
2020,
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The NLRA thus lumps employees into two crude categories — management
and non-management — and denies millions of American line and middle managers
any way to organize and protect their interests as employees. The EU model is
different, both in encouraging, through the Works Council process, in which
employees and middle managers work together to help the company operate more
effectively and harmoniously, but also in recognizing that managers have a legitimate
right to be heard collectively about their own conditions of Employment.84
As a result, the European worker participation model avoids a pitfall of the
current American labor regime:
the silencing of middle management. 85
Codetermination makes room for this nuance by distinguishing between middle
managers’ roles in the works councils process, and their right to join a union and
have board representation. Middle managers participate as part of the management
side on works councils at the facilities where they work, but are also accorded the

https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/01/29/most-ambitious-attempt-strengthenunions-years-will-be-voted-next-week/ (correctly predicting that despite growing discussions
about workers’ rights, the bill was unlikely to be acted upon by the Senate in 2020).
84

In Germany, middle managers are not prohibited from forming associations or
collectivizing. Lionel Fulton, Worker representation in Europe, Labour Research
Department and ETUI (2020) http://www.worker-participation.eu/National-IndustrialRelations/Across-Europe/Board-level-Representation. In contrast, American managers and
supervisors do not have access to union representation. See infra note 84 and accompanying
text.

See Ross Eisenbrey & Lawrence Mishel, Economic Policy Institute, Supervisor in
Name Only (2006) (the consequence of certain NLRB actions aiming to further broaden the
definition of “supervisor” would be the stripping of hundreds of thousands of employees of
their contract protections and millions more across the economy would be denied the option
of forming unions or engaging in collective bargaining); Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt & Michael
D. Ray, The Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training, The Definition of “Employee”
in American Labor and Employment Law (2004) (“The distinction between supervisors and
lead employees often comes down to a matter of degree. This issue is frequently decided
according to fact specific case by case approach. The modern trend in these cases has been
towards a greater willingness to find that the employees in question are supervisors and away
from analysis in terms of the Act’s policies.” (citations omitted)); see also Mark Barenberg,
The Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power, Symbol, and Workplace Cooperation,
106 Harv. L. Rev. 1379, 1492 (1993) (Taft-Hartley as well as post-World War II
administrative and judicial decisions “helped secure a more adversarial mode of
unionization, even if workers achieved a substantial degree of de factor ‘mutualism’ in shopfloor decision –making” and noting that as a result “[l]abor progressives’ hopes for the
immediate achievement of a labor-corporatist society died by the early 1960s, if not much
earlier”); Catherine Fisk, Supervisors in a World of Flat Hierarchies, 64 Hastings L.J. 1403,
1404-1415 (2013) (under the NLRA “a worker who meets the statutory definition of
‘supervisor’ does not enjoy the rights to form, join, or assist labor unions, to bargain
collectively over terms of employment, or to engage in other concerted activities for mutual
aid and protection.”).
85
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right to join a union and to have board representation to vindicate their own
legitimate interests as employees.

3. Eligibility to Serve on the Board and Pipelines to the Board
In most cases, an employee eligible to vote for worker directors is also eligible
to seek election as a director.86 Additionally, in some countries, such as Germany
and Luxembourg, external union representatives can stand for election, so long as
the external union representatives belong to a union with members in the company.
In fact, in these systems, employee member seats are set aside for trade union
representatives.87
In countries that rely on appointment methods other than direct elections,
the eligibility criteria varies. For example, in the Netherlands, where worker directors
are nominated by the board (upon recommendation of the works councils) and
approved by shareholders, those worker directors can be neither an employee of the
company nor a member of an affiliated union. 88 In France, the worker director
cannot hold any other elected role, such as union delegate or a member of the central
Social and Economic Committee.89 By contrast, in countries such as Denmark and
Norway, worker directors on the board must themselves be employees. 90 But

See, e.g., 1976 German Co-Determination Act § 7(4) (same eligibility criteria for
employees seeking election to the board as for voting, except that candidates must work for
the company for six months before serving as a director ).
86

87

1976 German Co-Determination Act § 7(1). The number of seats held by trade
union representatives depends on the size of the supervisory board. Id. In Germany some
of the workforce seats are reserved for external trade unionists, i.e. representatives from the
industry union(s) who are not employed in the company. This is the case for companies
employing more than 2,000 employees and for companies in the coal, iron and steel industry.
In Luxembourg, in the iron and steel industry, the three most representative national unions
have the right to nominate three board-level worker directors, even if they are not
represented within the company.
88

Act of May 6, 1971 (S 289) (The Netherlands) (Law of Structure) (work councils
nominate 1/3 of the board subject to the final approval of the shareholders).
89

French Commercial Code Art. L. 225-79 (2013).

The Swedish statute provides that all worker directors should be elected from among
the company’s employees. Swedish Act on Board Representation (Private Sector
Employees), SFS 1987:1245 §§ 6–10; Worker Participation in Management Act 1993.
90
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generally in the Nordic countries, unions play a central role in selecting these worker
directors,91 and union leaders often serve as the worker directors.92
The varying degree of union involvement in the election of worker directors
across European codetermination regimes partially reflects the differing levels of
power possessed by unions in these countries. For instance, in both the Netherlands
and France, where employee representation on the board has been defined to
exclude at least union representatives, union influence is waning. 93 By contrast,
workers in the Nordic countries enjoy robust union representation and, accordingly,
fewer eligibility restrictions.94
Not only do unions and works councils play a central role in the election
process, but they also serve as the grooming ground for future worker directors. For
example, in Germany, worker directors to the board are typically works councilors
or union members.95 Similarly, unions in some Nordic countries like Sweden are a
direct pipeline to the worker director seats on the board.96

4. Worker Director Election Mechanics
The process for electing worker directors varies by country and firm size. In
most codetermination systems across Europe, however, worker directors on the
board are appointed in one of four ways: (1) candidates are first nominated by the
company’s union(s), works councils, or employees and then elected by the
employees or their delegates;97 (2) candidates are first nominated by the company’s

Fulton, supra note 84 (“The employee representatives on the board are chosen by
the local union, with which the employer has a collective agreement. This is done either
through local agreement between the unions in the company, provided they represent a
majority of the employees, or, if agreement cannot be reached, a more formalised approach
is adopted.”).
91

Fulton, supra note 84 (“Employee directors are elected by the whole workforce and
they must themselves be employees. However, the unions have considerable influence on
the process and often the leading union figures within the company are also the worker
directors on the board.”).
92

93

Fulton, supra note 84.

John Logue, Trade unions in the Nordic countries, Nordics.info, AARHUS UNIV
(February 18, 2019), https://nordics.info/show/artikel/trade-unions-in-the-nordic-region/
(“The Nordic countries continue to have the highest union density in the world.”)
94

95

See Page, supra note 21 at 30.

See, e.g., Fulton, supra note 84 (in most cases worker directors are selected by one
or more of several labor unions and that they “can be chosen in a number of way including
election at the union meeting in the company, appointment by the union or a membership
ballot”).
96

97

The German Co-determination Act of 1976 §§ 15, 16 (large German firms are
presumptively subject to a process in which delegates are nominated by petition and elected
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board, union(s), or works councils and then elected by the shareholders; 98 (3)
representatives are appointed to the board by the company’s union(s) and/or works
councils;99 and (4) some combination of the three.100 The mechanics of elections vary
depending on which method a country employs.101 For our purposes, we will focus
on the first method, and the German system in particular, because it reflects the
structure contemplated by the current U.S. codetermination proposals.
For German companies, board level worker director elections begin with a
choice: election by the ballot or through a delegate. At German companies with
more than 8,000 employees, worker directors are elected by delegates, unless onehalf of the employees eligible to vote in the election opt for a direct election. German
companies with 8,000 employees or fewer are subject to direct elections, unless onehalf of the employees eligible to vote in the election opt for election through
delegates. Given the scope of the current U.S. proposals, our focus will be larger
German companies. Assuming the employees do not opt for a direct election,
delegates are nominated by employees who have amassed signatures representing
one-twentieth or 50 of the employees eligible to vote in their establishment.102 The
delegates elect worker members, executive staff members and union members, each
as nominated from among their own group.103 In the event of an objection to the

by the workers, and the worker representatives on the board are selected by the delegates);
Slovak Republic Act No 111/1990 of April, 19 1990 on State Enterprise; Act No 77/1997
Coll., on state enterprises.
98

Act of May 6, 1971 (S 289) (The Netherlands) (Law of Structure) (work councils
nominate 1/3 of the board subject to the final approval of the shareholders).
99

Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 42/1993, 61/2000, 56/2001,
26/2007, 45/2008; Swedish Act on Board Representation (Private Sector Employees), SFS
1987:1245 (1987) § 4 (employees are entitled to three seats on the board of directors and
delegates the power to invoke this right and select the workers to the unions.); Henry
Hansmann, When Does Worker Ownership Work? ESOPs, Law Firms, Codetermination,
and Economic Democracy, 99 Yale L.J. 1749, 1813 & n.209 (1990); Fulton, supra note 84
(“The worker directors on the board are chosen by the local union, with which the employer
has a collective agreement. This is done either through local agreement between the unions
in the company, provided they represent a majority of the employees, or, if agreement cannot
be reached, a more formalised approach is adopted.”).
100

French Commercial Code Art. L.225-79 (2013).

101

Natalie Videbæk Munkholm, Annual Conference of the European Centre of
Expertise, Board Level Employee Representation in Europe: an Overview 7 [[or § 3.1.4]
(2018) (“The methods for electing the representatives can be divided into two main
categories, with or without general elections/elections by delegates among all employees.”).
102

Gesetz Uber die Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer (Mitbestimmungsgesetz)
[German Co-determination Act], May 4, 1976, BGBL I, p. 1153, § 15(2) (“1976 German
Co-determination Act”).
103

Id.
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election of delegates or the election of worker directors, the results may be challenged
in the labor courts.104
The frequency of elections corresponds with the period of office of worker
directors on the board. In Germany, worker directors on the board serve the same
term of office as shareholder representatives—five-year, non-staggered terms.
Lengthy terms, uninterrupted by staccato staggered elections, allow worker directors
to get relevant experience and an incentive to invest the time necessary to be effective
directors.
That said, longer terms by nature give voters fewer opportunities to hold
wayward representatives accountable, and the U.S. context differs materially on the
balance between stability in pursuing sustainable growth and accountability to
stockholders at the ballot box.105 In the United States, the recent trend has been
strongly towards annually elected boards.106 Any system of board codetermination
will, as we address, have to reconcile the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of a system
where worker directors serve only a one-year term, especially given their
informational disadvantages, with this trend.107
The frequency of elections is closely related to the cost of worker director
elections. In Germany, the company bears expenses related to the election of worker
directors.108 And German companies are prohibited from reducing employees’ pay
as a result of lost working time related to exercising their right to vote or themselves
participating in the election.

5. European Codetermination in Action
Unlike the Anglo-American model, where a single board functions as a
management and oversight body, the German model divides functions across two

104

Id. §§ 21, 22.

105

Id. § 23.

106

See Dammann & Eidenmüller, supra note 37 at 911.

107

Though there are European codetermination systems in countries where the
common practice is for board members to serve one-year terms, generally the legal limit in
those countries is determined by the company’s articles of association. State Street Global
Advisors, Board Accountability in Europe: A Review of Director Election Practices Across
the Region (2018). Moreover, of the countries in which one-year terms for directors is the
norm, those that feature codetermination systems generally allow unions to directly appoint
worker directors to the board, which mitigates the high turnover rates associated with oneyear terms. See Conchon, supra note 68 at 12-13.
108

The format of the worker director campaigns, including the frequency, cadence and
distribution of communication with voters and delegates is not dictated by German law and
is generally decided on the company-level by election committees. See 1976 German Codetermination Act §§ 19-25.
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distinct bodies: the management board and the supervisory board. 109 Worker
representatives serve on the supervisory board alongside shareholder-elected
representatives. The supervisory board has ultimate authority and control over the
company. 110 The management board is appointed by the supervisory board and
manages the daily operations of the company, under the general direction of the
supervisory board.111
Codetermination may fit more naturally with a German two-tier structure
than the one-tier structure in the U.S. In some countries with one-tier boards, board
level worker representation rights are limited, because lawmakers worry about the
amount of power these directors might wield, given the board’s proximity to the daily
operations of the company as a whole.112 Indeed, in a number of European one-tier
systems there is no right to codetermination at all. 113 But, this is not true in all
countries with one-tier board systems. Most notably, the Nordic countries use onetier systems but employees in these countries enjoy strong codetermination rights.114
In most systems, the worker directors on the board have the same duties and
responsibilities as the shareholder-elected board members. Specifically, the worker
directors are subject to the same fiduciary duties, restricted by the same
confidentiality policies, and liable for board decisions as their fellow board
members.115 In some cases, such as the Nordic countries, however, worker directors
are prevented from participating in certain matters, such as industrial disputes,
collective bargaining or other types of issues where there is a clear conflict of interest
between the company and the employees.

109

David Block & Anne-Marie Gerstner, Comparative Corporate Governance and
Financial Regulation, One-Tier vs. Two-Tier Board Structure: A Comparison Between the
United States and Germany (2016); Klaus J. Hopt, European Corporate Governance
Institute, Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of the Art and International
Regulation 20-23 (2011).
110

Id.

111

Munkholm, supra note 103 at 1.

112

Conchon, supra note 68, at 24-26.

The UK and Switzerland are prominent examples. See Hwa-Jin Kim, supra note
67 at 388.
113

114

These countries delineate between the role of the board of directors (control) and
the role of the executive management (operations). This ends up functioning similarly to a
two-tier system for all intents and purposes. In the United States, the one-tier system is the
norm, but it operates more like the Nordic nations than the classic English model. In fact,
the English model itself is evolving with clearer division of responsibility between
management and the board and a heavier reliance on independent directors, much like the
U.S. system. Steen Thomsen, Caspar Rose, Dorte Kronborg, Copenhagen Business School,
Employee Representation and Board Size in the Nordic Countries 14 (2013).
115

Fulton, supra note 60.
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Generally speaking, the expectation is that worker directors should be neither
advantaged nor disadvantaged as a result as their service on the board. Accordingly,
they are protected from at-will dismissal and reprisal, or impediments to career
advancement116 and continue to receive their typical, day-job pay for their work on
the board, with reimbursements for out-of-pocket expenses.117 Worker directors are
entitled to training for their role, and such training must be adequate and funded by
the company.118
Just as worker directors are protected from discrimination due to their role
on the board, they cannot receive preferential treatment due to their service on the
board, including by earning any more than their regular salary or additional
compensation compared to their colleagues.119
This issue of director pay is another one in which the comparative differences
with the U.S. are important. Although director pay is rising in Germany and the EU
generally, it is still well below U.S. levels. If worker directors are seated in the U.S.,
there will two equity problems in tension with each other, treating them equitably
with respect to their board colleagues without unfairly enriching them in comparison
to the workers they are supposed to identify with and faithfully represent. There are
also differential workloads and travel time to consider, given the one-tier structure in
the U.S., and the increased burdens imposed in recent decades on directors.120

116

Under § 26 of the Codetermination Act, worker directors on the Supervisory Board
must not be hindered in carrying out their duties and not disadvantaged as a result of their
activities. The same applies to their career development.
117

Fulton, supra note 60.

118

Autorite Des Marches Financiers, 2019 Report on Corporate Governance and
Executive Compensation in Listed Companies 21 (2019) (French law provides that
“directors or members of the supervisory board shall receive ‘at their request . . . training
appropriate to the performance of their duties’, the cost of which shall be borne by the
company [and] that ‘the time allocated to this training may not be less than forty hours per
year”); Fulton, supra note 60 (in Germany, worker directors cannot be restricted in their
work as supervisory board members and should receive adequate training for the role).
119

The German corporate laws provide for liability of those persons who abuse their
influence on members of the supervisory board to induce them to act to the disadvantage of
the company or its shareholders. Aktiengesetz [AktG] [Stock Corporation Act], Sept. 6,
1965, BGBl I at 1089, last amended by Gesetz [G], July 17, 2017, BGBl I at 2446, art. 9
(Ger.), § 117, https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/aktg.
120

Because of the two-tier nature of German boards, supervisory board members likely
spend less time on board duties than the directors of American public companies. Block &
Gerstner, supra note 109 at 26 (“[The supervisory board] cannot interfere in the
management of the company.”). This, plus the greater geographic span of the U.S. and its
effect on travel burdens associated with board service, may require worker directors in the
U.S. to spend more time on board duties, an issue compounding the informational
disadvantages they will suffer in comparison to their EU-based colleagues.
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The Ends of Corporate Governance and Their Consistency with the
Philosophy of Codetermination

Like the corporate law in most EU nations, German law requires corporate
directors to advance the interests of the corporation and all its stakeholders, not just
the interests of stockholders. American commentators continue to fashion
arguments as to why there is an inherent conflict in having worker directors on
boards, especially if they believe that corporations should put stockholder interests
first.121 But potential conflicts always exist in corporate governance, and directors
elected by stockholders and who are stockholders themselves might have incentives
to make decisions that are contrary to the legal rights and legitimate expectations of
company creditors, workers, and consumers. No constituency has a more substantial
interest in the sustained profitability and viability of the company than its workers, as
they cannot diversify away the risk of its failure, as stockholders do.122 For that reason,
data shows that worker directors in the EU rank business issues relevant to the
company’s success and profitability high in their views of what is most important for
them to address.123
The German system enforces these norms by requiring that all members of
the board must advance the best interests of the company and all its stakeholders,
and that each worker director thus has a duty to respect and promote the welfare of
the stockholders. Correspondingly, although stockholders have the ability to elect a
functional majority of the board and other potent rights, the directors they elect in
the EU typically operate under corporate laws requiring them to govern the company
in a manner that is respectful to all company stakeholders, not just stockholders.124

See, e.g. Stephen Bainbridge, A Critique of Senator Elizabeth Warren’s
“Accountable Capitalism Act” (Part 6): The Case Against Codetermination and Employee
Involvement, ProfessorBainbridge.com (Aug. 17, 2018), https://bit.ly/2O12VeB (suggesting
121

that employee representation on boards would be counterproductive due to his view that
employees would have incentives to engage in value-destroying behavior); see also Dammann
& Eidenmüller, supra note 37 at 37-38 (“One of the core challenges of mandatory
codetermination is that it guarantees divided loyalties within the board: the shareholder
representatives know that they must please the shareholders to get reelected, whereas the
worker representatives know that their reelection depends on keeping employees satisfied.”);
Summers, supra note 20 at 169 (considering and rejecting this perspective).

Cf. Dammann & Eidenmüller, supra note 37 at 61 (suggesting that employees’
undiversifiable interest in a firm would make them overly risk averse).
122

Conchon & Waddington, supra note 26, at 104-06 (surveying views of directors
elected by workers and finding that business issues relevant to the firms’ profitability and
viability rank right behind concerns about employees in their view of what is important to
consider as a director, and well ahead of other considerations).
123

See,
e.g.,
Index
of
Codes,
Eur.
Corp.
Governance
Inst.,
https://ecgi.global/content/codes (last visited July 28, 2020) (collecting codes of various
European and other states); Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Soviet Constitution Problem in
124
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For example, in Germany, all board members are required to look to the interests of
employees and society as well as stockholders.125 As a consequence, there is no need
to set different duties for employee-elected directors and shareholder-elected
directors. All directors have the same obligation to advance the interests of the
corporation as a whole, as opposed to the interests of one constituency.126 Thus, there
is no more of a conflict for a worker director in balancing the required interests than
that faced by a stockholder-elected director in balancing interests.127
This general objective of weighing all stakeholder interests is backed by
specific provisions of German law that protect worker representatives despite their
minority status on the supervisory board. The worker representatives have the same
rights as other directors, and are expected to maintain the same approach to
confidentiality and conflicts.128 Procedural requirements often reinforce these general

Comparative Corporate Law: Testing the Proposition that European Corporate Law is More
Stockholder Focused Than U.S. Corporate Law, 89 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1239, 1247 & n.11 (2016)
(“most European countries have corporate laws that expressly state that the corporation’s
managers have a duty to consider all the stakeholders of the corporation, not just
stockholders, when managing the enterprise”); Martin Gelter & Geneviève Helleringer, Lift
Not the Painted Veil! To Whom Are Directors’ Duties Really Owed?, 2015 U. Ill. L. Rev.
1069, 1089-92 (an “institutional” approach to corporations emphasizing its distinctive
interests has been prevalent in continental Europe, as opposed to a “contractual” view
focused on the interests of shareholders).

See, e.g., Regierungskommission Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex,
German Corporate Governance Code 2019 (Dec. 16, 2019), https://ecgi.global/node/7493
125

at 2 (“The Code highlights the obligation of Management Boards and Supervisory Boards –
in line with the principles of the social market economy – to take into account the interests
of the shareholders, the enterprise’s workforce and the other groups related to the enterprise
(stakeholders) to ensure the continued existence of the enterprise and its sustainable value
creation (the enterprise’s best interests).”); Strine, Soviet Constitution Problem, supra note
124 at 1247 & n.12 (“For example, German corporate law directs managers to attend to the
interests of shareholders, employees, and society as a whole.”); Michael Bradley et al., The

Purposes and Accountability of the Corporation in Contemporary Society: Corporate
Governance at a Crossroads, 62 Law & Contemp. Probs. 9, 52 (1999) (“corporate law in
Germany makes it abundantly clear that shareholders are only one of the many stakeholders
on whose behalf the managers must operate the firm”); Marleen A. O’Connor, Human

Capital ERA: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to Facilitate Labor-Management
Cooperation, 78 Cornell L. Rev. 899, 959 n.256 (1993) (“German directors are charged by
law to carry out their responsibilities in the ‘interests of the company.’”).
126

See Gelter & Helleringer, supra note 124 at 1092-97.
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Cf. Summers, supra note 20 at 169.

See, e.g., AFEP-MEDEF, Corporate Governance Code of Listed Companies (June
2018), https://ecgi.global/node/6812 at 7 (covering requirements for French companies);
Regierungskommission Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex, German Corporate
Governance Code 2019 (Dec. 16, 2019), https://ecgi.global/node/7493 at 7, 13.
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principles. For example, at large German companies, worker directors hold half of
the seats on the supervisory board, with ties broken by a shareholder-selected
chairman.129 To ensure that the worker representatives are meaningfully consulted
on the selection of the management board, a two-thirds majority of the supervisory
board is required to select the management board in the first instance.130 If this is not
achieved, shareholders have their way, but only through a multistage process in which
the employee-elected directors are involved at each step.131
These rules are not perfect, and some German firms have found ways to
prevent them from having their intended effect. For example, Professor Mark Roe
reports that early studies had shown widespread use of mechanisms to put formal
and informal power in the hands of stockholder representatives on the supervisory
board.132 These mechanisms included the selection of additional vice-chairs, equitycontrolled subcommittees, and additional power for stockholder-elected chairmen.133
More recent commentary suggests that firms try to avoid codetermination
requirements entirely by restructuring as British plcs or Societas Europaea before
they meet important thresholds, or seek to persuade employees that formal works
council structures are not useful by finding other ways to be responsive.134
Where these measures fail, stockholders of German companies can lean on
the stockholder-elected chairman, or go around the supervisory board on ordinary
governance matters and engage directly with managers. 135 Codetermination
requirements apply only to the supervisory board, and not to the managerial board
charged with day-to-day operation of the company. As a result, these tactics can put

See 1976 German Codetermination Act §§ 27, 29. A two-thirds majority of the
supervisory board elects a chairman and deputy. Id. § 27(1). If this is not achieved, the
shareholders’ members select the chairman and the employees’ members elect the deputy.
Id. § 27(2). If the supervisory board is ever deadlocked, the chairman has two votes. Id.
§ 29(2).
129

130

Id. § 31(2).

Id. §§ 31(3)-(4). The structure and size of the management board varies by
company, with as many as 12 members, and with the chairman of the management board
often wielding the power of an American CEO. See Thomas J. André, Jr., Cultural
131

Hegemony: The Exportation of Anglo-Saxon Corporate Governance Ideologies to
Germany, 73 Tul. L. Rev. 69, 89 (1998).
132

Mark J. Roe, Political Determinants of Corporate Governance; Political Context,
Corporate Impact 75-76 (2003).
133

Id. at 76.

Unseating an old idea, Deutschland AG rethinks workers’ role in management, The
Economist (Feb. 1, 2020), https://www.economist.com/business/2020/02/01/deutschland-agrethinks-workers-role-in-management (explaining that “companies that can avoid codetermination try to do so” and describing means of evasion).
134

135

Roe, supra note 132 at 74-75.
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the most critical issues outside the reach of worker director on the board. In the
meantime, large stockholders are often important financial institutions that can
obtain information from management in their capacity as creditors without sharing
the information with the supervisory board or its worker director.136
These realities, occurring within a system that does much more to level the
playing field for workers than the American system, underscore the need to make
sure that worker directors have a support structure that helps them meaningfully
serve their intended role.

E.

External Regulation and Context

German firms operate in a different domestic corporate governance and
political context than American companies. The differences include a divergent
financial system with lower levels of investor pressure, government involvement in
investment and protecting so-called “national champions,”137 a stronger social safety
net which limits opportunities to compete by squeezing worker benefits, and sectoral
bargaining.
Although there has been increasing pressure by institutional investors to
move the EU toward a more U.S.-style system of corporate governance, shareholder
activism has historically been less of a force in Europe.138 European stock markets
are also still characterized less by diffuse investors holding small stakes than by
important financial institutions, with long-standing relationships with companies, and
families controlling large blocks. 139 These features affect German board

136

Id.

137

“National champion” firms are major players in a given industry that are protected
and defended by government policymakers. See Matteo Gatti, Upsetting Deals and Reform
Loop: Can Companies and M&A Law in Europe Adapt, 25 Colum. J. of Eur. L. 1, 5 (2019)
(describing transactions involving various European national champions, and protectionist
responses).

Call to action, Investor activism is surging in continental Europe, The Economist
(Aug. 24, 2017), https://www.economist.com/business/2017/08/24/investor-activism-issurging-in-continental-europe (noting that “tussles used to be relatively rare in Europe” but
that they are “on the rise”).
138

Roe, supra note 132 at 77. We do not wish to overstate this. In the last decade,
activism has grown in the EU, more dispersed ownership is developing but in a way that is
increasing the power of mutual funds families like those in the U.S., and the European
Commission has expressed concern that these developments are reducing the leverage of
workers, increasing inequality, and subjecting more European workers to wage stagnation,
potential unemployment, and economic insecurity. See European Commission, Study on
directors’
duties
and
sustainable
corporate
governance
27
(2020),
https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/e47928a2-d20b-11ea-adf701aa75ed71a1/language-en. (“short-term value creation for shareholders was prioritised at
the expense of better employee compensation”); id. at 28 (“growing pressures from
139
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codetermination. In Germany—unlike the United States—directors are not routinely
subject to activist attacks by short-termist hedge funds that force the company to put
shareholders over employees, and they do face concentrated owners with a real
financial interest in controlling agency costs.
European governments also play a more active role in ensuring that their
market economies are fair to workers. By ways of example, Germany is committed
to a “Social Market Economy” model, in which the government is responsible for
promoting prosperity and economic security for all its citizens.140 As the German
government explains:
[O]ur society practices solidarity in that it provides for
all those who are not able to generate an income, or
can only earn very little money due to their age, for
medical reasons, or as a result of unemployment. Our
public social security system is financed by
contributions from both employers and employees
and provides for a strong safety net. Our tax and
welfare system is also designed to promote social
cohesion. The government makes sure that people
are protected against serious risks (e.g. by making
health insurance mandatory) . . . .141
As we have noted, apart from the high floor on worker wellbeing set by
government intervention, many European countries use sectoral bargaining to further
limit the scope for competition on labor terms.142 As a result, firms are forced to
compete on dimensions such as improving productivity and product quality, instead
of reducing wages or working conditions.
III.

A MINIMALIST APPROACH

This German-focused overview highlights a number of challenging
implementation issues for adopting even a minimalist approach to codetermination

institutional and activist investors increasingly focused on the short-term market value of the
shares, places intense pressure on corporate boards to prioritise the market valuation of the
company and focus on short-term financial performance, driving down all other costs, at the
expense of better employee compensation and stronger investments that are important for
long-term productivity.”).

See The Social Market Economy, ‘Prosperity for all’. A thriving economy combined
with a social rebalancing scheme, Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy
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(accessed Oct. 20, 2020), https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/EN/Dossier/the-social-marketeconomy.html.
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See supra notes 59 to 62.
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in the United States. If the adoption of codetermination is to help American workers
and competitiveness, these issues cannot be sloughed off as details. They are too
fundamental to the effectiveness, fairness and efficiency of board codetermination to
not be addressed in a serious way.

A.

Who gets to vote?

To illustrate why, let’s return to the most basic moral and policy issues of all:
is board codetermination at American firms designed to protect all workers of
covered companies, or just the American workers? This is a moral issue for an
obvious reason: a worker is a human being worthy of respect irrespective of her
nation of employment.
There are some practical reasons to limit the franchise to workers based in
the United States. Some commentators have suggested that the costs of
codetermination increase when the workforce is heterogeneous and worker interests
will conflict. 143 This argument applies with stronger force in the U.S., which is
geographically far larger than even Germany, a reality that must be taken into account
in many levels of system design, including this one. 144 Compounding that greater
diversity and span further by granting the franchise to workers in different countries,
perhaps at different stages of economic development, may stress the system to an
unacceptable degree. The complexity and administrative cost of worker voting would
increase dramatically, as would the difficulty of relying on existing agencies like the
SEC and existing processes like proxy voting.145 The SEC, or whichever regulatory
body oversaw the basic apparatus of voting, plus the state courts of incorporation,
would be required to oversee elections with large overseas blocs of voters. This
happens in the corporate context of course, but through well-developed procedures
honed over time that involve institutional investors and other intermediaries
facilitating the vote, using U.S.-based procedures.
Pragmatically, we recognize that codetermination is part of a national
commitment to improving the lot of domestic workers and their voice in domestic
companies’ governance. The goal of members of the U.S. Senate who support
codetermination is to do something positive for U.S. workers, and an international
scope for elective rights would dilute that focus. And, unless other nations with
codetermination changed their approach, American workers would be in an
imbalanced international system of codetermination where they were not protected
when they worked for a German company in the U.S., but their German counterparts
had voting rights at U.S. companies.
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Hansmann, supra note 99.
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See infra note 178 and accompanying text.
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See infra Part III.D.
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More fundamentally, our general thesis in this Article is that board
codetermination requires a proper regulatory and economic context to be successful.
Although the United States may choose to adopt the reforms necessary to support
board codetermination,146 other nations where U.S. companies operate may lack the
necessary regulatory context, choose different strategies for protecting their workers,
or simply rationally strike a different balance as to their workers. Just as we cannot
import one aspect of German codetermination without an appropriate supporting
infrastructure, we should hesitate to press one aspect of an American
codetermination scheme upon American companies’ operation in other countries.147
But even if there are some practical rationales for the choice, limiting the
franchise to America-based workers, as we suspect members of Congress supporting
board codetermination intend, does suggest a preference for American workers over
foreign workers.
And for a global leader like the U.S. to do this might invite reciprocal action
concentrating on domestic workers. Because many U.S. workers are employed by
foreign corporations,148 this could be problematic. That said, as the German and
Scandinavian examples show, American workers at foreign companies already face
second-class treatment in terms of board-level codetermination and the lack of works
council protections.149 Thus, an American-focused system might level the playing
field. And, as we identify, there are means short of voting rights to elevate concern
for all the workers of American companies, including those working abroad and for
offshore contractors, in a manner that mitigates concerns about nativism and that
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See infra Part IV.
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If foreign workers were granted votes, brutal regimes might seek to pressure workers
in their countries, and coopt their votes at American companies to advance a nationalist
agenda. This point should not be overstated. After all, foreign shareholders are able to cast
votes at American companies today, and it is not clear that those votes are being used to
advance an agenda hostile to American interests. But processes like review by the
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) help mitigate the dangers
of foreign equity-like investments in American companies. A complex mechanism might be
needed to work through similar issues if a codetermination scheme granted the franchise to
foreign workers.
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In 2017, 7.4 million workers in the United States were employed by U.S. affiliates
of foreign multinational enterprises—this accounts for roughly 6% of the U.S. private
workforce. News Release, U.S. Bureau of Econ. Analysis, Activities of U.S. Affiliates of
Foreign
Multinational
Enterprises,
2017,
(Nov.
15,
2019),
https://www.bea.gov/news/2019/activities-us-affiliates-foreign-multinational-enterprises-2017.

See infra note 80 and accompanying text (discussing the Volkswagen workers’ fight
to get works council representation in the Chattanooga, Tennessee plant).
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would also put useful upward pressure on global worker pay and conditions of
employment, which would benefit U.S. workers as well.150
Absent some more serious attention to the interests of all workers within the
governance of large American companies, a domestic preference is also morally
complicated because American workers, although suffering in terms of wage
stagnation compared to prior generations, are typically compensated better than their
foreign colleagues.151 And there is evidence that the discrimination against foreign
workers in Germany’s system has privileged German workers, while fostering costcutting at the expense of the company workers not employed in Germany.152
In the European context, this discrimination is tempered by the EU Works
Council Directive, which requires that employees in the EU benefit from
establishment-level codetermination,153 even if they do not have the right to vote for
board members. Because works councils have important rights, this helps to level
the playing field for EU-based employees of German and Scandinavian companies.154
As we note below,155 there are good reasons to give weight to the interests of foreign
workers in striking trade agreements, even if foreign workers are not granted a vote.
Of course, the matter of voter eligibility turns not only on where employees
reside but also who they are and what positions within their companies they occupy.
The evolving nature of modern economies complicates the analysis of who qualifies
as an “employee.” This difficulty of defining “employee” for the purposes of
affording workers with certain rights, protections, and responsibilities is seemingly as
American as apple pie. American courts, legislatures, and agencies have long
grappled with this same definitional challenge in the labor, employment, and tax law

See infra Section IV.C-D (discussing the requirement that the traditional
compensation committees expand its focus from matters concerning solely the
compensation of executives and directors to include all workers, including foreign and
contract workers).
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Average Wages, OECD Data,
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See Dammann & Eidenmüller, supra note 37 at 11 n.28 (“highly questionable”
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See Council Directive 94/45/EC1994 O.J. (L 254) 64.

See Hans Boeckler Foundation, Better Corporate Governance in Europe through
Employee Boardroom Participation (2015) (an EU directive requiring that all companies
taking a European legal form offer employees representation at the board level would
establish a minimum standard across Europe and help combat regulatory arbitrage and
worker discrimination based on nationality). See also supra note 97.
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contexts.156 But it is a contentious issue, and a narrow definition could compromise
the utility of a codetermination scheme by leaving voiceless many contracted workers
who deserve a greater say than they now get.
The regime would also have to distinguish between workers entitled to
representation through the codetermination regime, and executives who are not. In
modern companies, workers are often categorized or titled as managers or
supervisors when, in reality, they wield little power.157 There are numerous models
for how best to carve out and define the various roles in the labor and employment
context. 158 Unfortunately, there is no consensus or standard. A successful
codetermination proposal will need to specify whether it will rely on previous
definitions of “employee” or whether it will create its own.159 To the extent that the
term for board codetermination leaves out frontline and middle managers, it will not
aid in addressing the lack of voice given them under the NLRA.

B.

Who gets to serve and how much do they get paid?

Another key issue that American advocates of codetermination have not
thought about is how worker directors would be compensated and, if they are to be
employees, how their service would be balanced with their daily duties. In Germany,
there are regulations that govern pay and time for board service.

See Seth C. Oranburg, Unbundling Employment: Flexible Benefits for the Gig
Economy, 11 Drexel L. Rev. 1, 23 (2018) (“While the NLRA defines employee one way,
156

the NLRB takes another position, the IRS offers a third [indeed, the IRS has taken different
and even contradictory positions], and appellate courts in different circuits offer a fourth,
fifth, sixth, and seventh approach, while the Supreme Court has held only that there cannot
be any one test.”)

See supra notes 86 to 87 and accompanying text (describing the exclusions of the
broadly defined “supervisors” from the protections and privileges of the NLRA).
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United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 713 (1947) (“The problem of differentiating
between employee and an independent contractor or between an agent and an independent
contractor has given difficulty through the years before social legislation multiplied its
importance. When the matter arose in the administration of the National Labor Relations
Act . . . we pointed out that the legal standards to fix responsibility for acts of servants,
employees or agents had not been reduced to such certainty that it could be said there was
‘some simple, uniform and easily applicable test.’” (citation omitted)).
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In making this determination, policymakers must not allow companies to
gerrymander their constituencies by designating individuals as independent contractors
instead of employees, or by outsourcing tasks to smaller specialized firms. A trend toward
smaller specialized firms of this kind has had a negative impact on worker well-being. See
generally David Weil, The Fissured Workplace: Why Work Became So Bad for So Many
and What Can Be Done to Improve It (2014).
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By contrast, the U.S. has had no sustained experience with board
codetermination160 and no model on which to build for determining how worker161
directors would be compensated and how their duties in their regular job would be
adjusted to enable their service. Not only that, U.S. boards are highly compensated
and the pay for non-management directors has soared, to where it is an average of
$304,856 for the top 500 companies,162 and $167,013 for the Russell 3000.163 These
averages far exceed the American median family income of $68,703.164
These are important issues in determining how codetermination is supposed
to work in the U.S. If it is designed to ensure that the boardroom is populated with
members who can identify with company workers, then it matters whether the
members continue to have to do their day jobs, and whether they receive an
economic windfall. 165 How to work out those issues is not an insubstantial task,
because the outcome will have both functional and symbolic consequences. As with

Summers, supra note 20 at 155 (citing Bernstein, Workplace Democratization: Its
Internal Dynamics (1976)) (stressing limited U.S. public company experience with board
codetermination); Phillip I. Blumberg, Eli Goldston & George D. Gibson, Corporate
160

Social Responsibility Panel: The Constituencies of the Corporation and the Role of the
Institutional Investor, 28 Bus. Law. 177 (1973) (“[E]mployee representation on the Board
is relatively unknown in American corporate life.”).
161

Some distinguished commentators have pointed out that there is isolated American
experience with board codetermination. Ewan McGaughey, Democracy in America at
Work: The History of Labor’s Vote in Corporate Governance. 42 Seattle U. L. Rev. 697,
719 (2019) (“[I]t is clear that Clyde Summers’ opinion that the United States had ‘no
experience with employee representation on corporate boards’ went too far.’”). But, these
attempts to show that there is a lineage of some U.S. experimentation with codetermination
underscore how exceptional they were and how little they provide a guide for implementing
codetermination economy-wide. Id. at 719; see also Carlos Ray Gullett, The Impact of

Employee Representation Plans Upon the Development of Management-Worker
Relationships in the United States, La. St. Univ., 23 (1970) (“The few employers who
instituted such systems claimed a remarkable success for their plans, although it is clear that
their approach to industrial problems was considered at the least somewhat eccentric by
other businessmen.”).
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many other issues, the larger geographic span of the U.S. also has to be considered,
and the resolution of this issue will also turn on who is eligible to serve and to vote.
In terms of who gets to serve, the bills in Congress do not limit the scope of
those eligible to serve as worker directors to current employees of the company.166 In
the past when union prevalence was higher, union representatives were often
presented as potential worker directors in a potential U.S. codetermination scheme.167
The advantage to this option is that the union leader likely has experience on a board
or, at least, practice engaging with management and the leaders of the company.168
The problem now, however, is that private sector union density is now slightly below
10%, making this solution impractical for most companies.169
In most codetermination systems, the assumption is that the directors elected
by workers will be company workers themselves.170 And they have well designed
regulatory provisions to provide them with required leave, educational support, and,
of course, the informational and institutional support provided by the works councils
and greater union density.171 The U.S. would have to try to replicate some of this in
the early stages of any implementation with board codetermination, by providing
opportunities for education, information-gathering, and adequate leave for worker
directors. To deal with economic questions, it could be that worker directors could
receive a reasonable stipend of up to, say, 15% on top of their usual pay to
compensate them for their extra duties. By these means, they would receive some
fair remuneration for their effort but still identify economically with the workers they
represent.
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See infra Section I (discussing the Reward Work Act and the Accountable

Capitalism Act).

See also Summers, supra note 20 at 179 (“[E]ach of three vice-presidents of the Auto
Workers could be elected to the board of the “Big Three” automobile companies; and each
of the members of the International Executive Board of the Steelworkers could hold a
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(1981).
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But it is not invariably the case that worker directors have to be workers
themselves.172 In the U.S. context, however, such an approach would raise concerns
about a class of highly-paid office seekers, who competed for worker votes in order
to get high board pay. This could create another class of independent directors for
hire, just this time ones who sought votes from workers, not institutional investors.
Not only that, the absence of works councils underneath the board and lower levels
of union concentration would exacerbate the informational disadvantages for
outsider directors that will inevitably be faced by worker directors in the U.S.173 On
what basis would these directors have sufficient information on what is going on at
the ground floor to fairly represent the workforce effectively in the boardroom? And
on what basis would they ground their legitimacy to the workforce of a company for
which they do not labor themselves?
For present purposes, we take no position on how these questions should be
answered. We just observe that they are important. And, in fact, our hesitance to
venture preliminary answers results in no small part from our view that too little
thinking has been done by advocates of U.S. codetermination about these issues, and
therefore the pro’s and con’s of the possible policy choices can only be guessed at,
because there is an unreliable foundation of information and a lack of reasoned back
and forth from interested parties and expert commentators to suss out the important
issues and come to a responsible resolution.

C.

How frequently are campaigns conducted, how are they conducted, and who
pays for them?

Another area slighted by U.S. advocates of codetermination is how the
election system would function. There are important dimensions on which the U.S.
varies from the EU dynamic in ways that must be addressed.
For starters, the U.S. is much larger geographically than even Germany.
Germany is one of the largest codetermination nations and it is one-twenty-eighth the
physical size of the U.S. 174 Although technology has made communications and
voting less dependent on physical locations, the bigger geographic area of the U.S.
has implications. Because the U.S. is larger and a bigger market, American
companies are more likely to have dispersed workforces over a more substantial
reach of territory. This makes it difficult for candidates to ensure that they
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Even where unions are present to fill such informational gaps, confidentiality
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understand the issues faced by the company’s entire workforce and how best to
communicate with voters during a campaign. It also raises the costs, as the larger and
more spread out a workforce, the more expensive the election process will be, both
in terms of campaigning and administration. Of course, there are countervailing
considerations, because internal communication within companies is easier than
ever, and the electorate will be confined to some group of companies’ employees
who are identifiable and can be reached by the candidates.175 And one upside of the
awful COVID-19 pandemic may be that most Americans are more familiar with
interacting by video platforms with each other. The use of Zoom and other similar
services could aid in allowing for effective and convenient communications. With
appropriate regulation governing how and when communications are made, a
feasible and relatively affordable system can be developed.
As to that point, American corporate elections involving public companies
have traditionally involved close regulation by the Securities and Exchange
Commission and state corporate law. The SEC has detailed regulations governing
the form in which candidates for boards can make communications soliciting
support.176 Typically, the company itself pays for the communications on behalf of
the management slate, and any opposing slate funds its own efforts. In recent
decades, there has been interest in initiatives to subsidize insurgent slates, and there
has been growing adoption of proxy access provisions that give insurgents with a
certain level of support subsidies for campaigning.177 But, more commonly, it still
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remains the case that proxy fights are funded by a highly-motivated interest, such as
a hostile bidder or activist hedge fund, that expects to profit if it prevails at the ballot
box.
American board seats are also now contested more frequently than in the
past. 178 Classified boards are in decline, especially among the largest public
companies.179 Thus, most seats are up annually. This increases the number and
therefore costs of elections. Last year in the U.S., 21,358 directors stood for election
at public companies.180 The costs of annual elections are considerable already, and
adding a special process for the annual election of worker-elected candidates would
increase those costs, especially because the rules for those elections would have to be
somewhat different, including the means of communications for the contending
candidates.
This trend toward one year terms, if continued as to worker directors, would
also mean that a candidate can only count on a year in office for the effort of running.
This is a factor that is likely to weigh more heavily on a candidate seeking a workerelected seat than a professional independent director who has achieved a place on a
management slate or who is being offered up by an activist fund. As important, there
is no tradition in the U.S. for generating qualified board candidates for election by
workers. So the question of how an initial cadre of candidates with the experience
and credibility to put themselves forward would be developed, and how these
candidates would organize and fund their campaigns, remains an open and novel one
in the American context.
No doubt some relevant learning might be found by looking at how union
leadership elections are conducted, but with union density being so low, that
experience will be one alien to many workforces.181 These factors contrast with EU

this rule, “a related amendment to Rule 14a-8 became effective in September 2011, opening
the door to shareholder proposals seeking proxy access”); Proxy Access, Council of
Institutional Investors, https://www.cii.org/proxy_access (last visited Jan. 25, 2021) (“[A]s of
the end of 2018, at least 580 companies have proxy access in place, including 71% of the
S&P 500 and 48% of the Russell 1000”).
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practice, where nations are smaller and there is a regulatory and institutional
infrastructure to develop and support qualified candidates.
To implement an effective U.S. system, therefore, a number of issues would
have to be addressed:


How to ensure that all U.S. workers get to meaningfully participate in the
electorate, given our large geography?



How to ensure that a pool of qualified candidates can emerge at each
company, especially given the absence of works councils and low union
density?



How to vet candidates for ultimate submission, in terms of ensuring that they
demonstrate enough preliminary support and sufficient credentials to warrant
inclusion on an understandable ballot comprised of a discrete number of
contending candidates, and how would this process work in terms of funding?



How would candidates for the ultimate ballot have their campaigns financed?



Would the company be responsible for distributing their literature on an
even-handed basis on the company’s information technology platform under
rules specified by the government? How would communications be
distributed to blue collar workers, or workers with limited facility with written
materials? And would this be under the purview of regulations set by the
SEC or another agency?



Would candidates be subject to the securities laws and would there be
standard formats developed to help candidates present their platforms and
credentials in a credible and trustworthy way, in terms of having to be
responsible for making false and misleading statements?



Is there an efficient model that might be adopted, perhaps building on the
proposal process under Rule 14a-8, that would allow worker-elected
candidates to communicate in an effective, but not unduly expensive way,
with the electorate? Including perhaps, procedures for a series of
informational forums online where eligible candidates are given the ability to
communicate their views without interruption or debate for 15 minutes each?



What terms would worker directors serve and how would this be
synchronized with the terms of other board members? Could a system of
triennial terms for worker directors be created under federal law, with
companies on a rotating schedule, to ease the administrative burden of
implementing these elections and to sync with stockholder elections under
state law?

years since the law was enacted, those rights have become increasingly inaccessible to the
overwhelming majority of the U.S. workforce.”).
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Would federal law encourage a return to classified boards to facilitate more
stability, more incentive for directors to invest in education and informationgathering, to reduce administrative costs, and synchronize the terms of all
directors?



If the purpose of codetermination is to focus U.S. companies more on
making money in a way that is consistent with the best interests of workers
and society, should an overall system encouraging longer-term thinking be
put in place? And how would this be done in terms of coordination between
state and federal law?

These details must be thoughtfully addressed in any successful U.S.
codetermination proposal, especially as many of them could implicate other legal
and regulatory systems currently in place. The proponents of U.S. codetermination
should look to how operative regimes abroad have answered these questions and
adopt best practices to the extent compatible with state and federal corporate law.
We venture a few suggestions of our own as to how to do this later.

D.

How are elections administered?

Running elections will involve some of the same problems as running
campaigns. At present, the NLRB-supervised election process for recognizing
unions is widely regarded as a failure, in part because of employer success in using
lawful and unlawful means to prevent unions from being fairly recognized. 182
Likewise, the NLRB has long been considered to lack the resources to do what it is
asked to do now, so that it is not a likely candidate for having the resources to take
on more duties, especially in a realm with which it has little relevant experience.183
Although it is true that there are analogies that can be drawn to union elections,

See Catherine L. Fisk & Deborah C. Malamud, The NLRB in Administrative Law
Exile: Problems with its Structure and Function and Suggestions for Reform, 58 Duke L.J.
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resources to pursue enforcement actions during Democratic administrations); Fisk &
Malamud, supra note 182 at 2015 (“Unfortunately, the NLRB is not well suited to the
regulatory task of bringing public-minded rationality to the processes of labor organizing and
collective bargaining.”). The NLRB also has limited policymaking tools, because of the
NLRB’s design, pressure by hostile Administrations, and strategic decisions to rely on
adjudication instead of rulemaking. See, e.g., Hiba Hafiz, Economic Analysis of Labor
Regulation, 2017 Wisc. L. Rev 1115 (2018) (describing statutory ban on hiring economists
at the NLRB); Aneil Kovvali, Seminole Rock and the Separation of Powers, 36 Harv. J.L. &
Pub. Pol’y 849, 851 (2013) (discussing some causes and implications of the NLRB’s reliance
on adjudications instead of rulemaking to make policy).
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American union elections are based on bargaining units that are typically not
company-wide. And unions themselves elect their own officers and directors, in
accordance with minimum standards set by law.184
At least at one level, there would be some reason for optimism that
codetermination elections for worker representatives to corporate boards would be
less troublesome than union certification votes, because the stakes for employers
would be diminished. Workers would be voting on the identity of the
representatives, not the existence of representation.
But supervision would have to be addressed. Although the United States has
federal agencies focused on labor issues, including the National Labor Relations
Board and the Office of Labor-Management Standards, they lack the resources,
experience, and consistent bipartisan support required to maintain an active role in
every corporate election.185 As indicated, the number of corporate elections in the
U.S. is much larger annually, and the number of board seats contested even more
so.
That said, in this instance, there is an American tradition to build on:
companies oversee their own elections for shareholder representatives on the board,
and there is a well understood system to count the votes and to ensure that there is
no fraud. The oversight of corporate elections has occurred at the state level, with
great success. Federal securities laws, as interpreted by the SEC, provide a template
for communications. Fights about electoral irregularities or ballot counting are had
under state corporate law and litigated in state courts, on an expedited basis.
Although it does not always work, this system overwhelmingly functions with
integrity, as evidenced by the frequency with which American incumbent boards lose
at the ballot box in contested proxy contests and on fights over other important issues.
Building on existing practices in an efficient way would seem more promising than
taking an overstretched agency like the NLRB and giving it a new election supervision
function that it lacks the resources and skills to undertake well. In other words, it
seems more efficient and effective to have the backbone regulations about
communications to the electorate set by the SEC, with state courts enforcing
standards of fairness if there is an election contest.
To increase integrity in the early stages when there is not yet experience, the
SEC might require the random employment of outside observers to monitor and
certify elections at the company’s expense. And the SEC could require that the
company employ, as they do with their regular annual meetings, a reliable system to
ensure fair counting of the ballots. Outside audit firms or firms that handle proxy
voting for annual shareholder meetings, both of which have experience in this area,

See, e.g., Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 § 401, 29
U.S.C. § 481 (setting maximum terms of office and minimum standards for elections and
campaigns).
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See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
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can be engaged to play roles similar to the ones they already routinely undertake as
to other corporate elections and contested votes. 186 Likewise, although most
contested corporate elections are done with competing proxy solicitations, there is a
move towards adopting a universal ballot with requirements set by the SEC to ensure
fairness, a system that if adopted would facilitate board codetermination.
We have no doubt that regulations will be required to standardize
communications practices, prevent fraud and misleading communications, and
facilitate worker voting. Workers are not like the institutional investors who now
dominate shareholder voting, with staffs to make sure they vote, and advisors to help
them do it efficiently. In the modern era, workers will need some ability to cast a
secure ballot, likely at the workplace, and in a manner that is trustworthy, auditable,
and confidential, in the sense that the employer should not be able to determine for
whom particular employees voted. Balancing efficiency and fairness in the design of
this kind of system of voting has its challenges, and this may be an area where the
NLRB could assist the SEC. But where the scope of ballots to be cast is so large as
to require that the companies themselves have to set up the system, regulatory criteria
promoting integrity will be essential.
The bulk of regulation and adjudication could be left to state governments.
The current U.S. approach to board elections is a joint federal-state enterprise. The
proxy machinery used by the candidates and companies is regulated by the SEC. But
the election process itself is governed by state corporate law. Election contests are
refereed in state court, and on an expedited basis.187 Policymakers should consider
using the state court of the company’s state of incorporation as the forum to resolve
any contested elections, in fidelity with SEC regulations. 188 By this means, board
election contests would be speedily and consistently resolved, and in a manner that
has functioned fairly and promptly for generations, assuming, as we reasonably do,
that controversy will be the exception instead of the rule. This should reduce the
need for substantial investments in the federal bureaucracy, and the burden on
federal courts that would result if they were required to act with the speed that
corporate election contests require.
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Examples include Broadridge.

See Donald J. Wolfe, Jr. & Michael A. Pittenger, 1 Corp. & Commercial Prac. in
the Del. Ct. of Chancery § 9.09.
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State courts frequently apply federal law, including in the securities law area, and
have shown themselves to be efficient and fair in adjudicating proxy contests between
insurgents and incumbent management. See generally Wolfe & Pittenger, supra note 187
(compiling the numerous cases in which the Delaware courts have decided election contests
in an expedited manner and discussing the importance with which those cases are treated).
As a result, they are well-positioned to timely and fairly resolve any disputes over who won a
director election in which the workers were the voters.
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How does the board operate?

The actual operation of a board with worker representatives will be the
subject of contention by some commentators, who will no doubt argue that worker
directors will face an inherent conflict of interest. A majority of American public
companies are incorporated in Delaware. Under Delaware law, a board has wide
discretion to take an action benefiting stakeholders like employees or communities,
so long as that action has a rational relationship to the interests of stockholders.189
This is a forgiving test that gives corporate fiduciaries broad leeway to balance the
interests of all stakeholders. The standard does impose important limits, especially
when a company is to be sold. In that important context, the highest price for
stockholders must be put first.190
Unlike Delaware, a majority of American states have constituency statutes
that allow boards to treat stakeholders as equal ends of corporate governance. Some
commentators have suggested that these arrangements do not improve outcomes for
stakeholders.191 These claims are contested,192 but it is clear that these constituency
statutes, like Delaware’s corporate law regime, also make directors subject to election
only by stockholders, and the directors only have a “may” duty to other stakeholders,
while having a powerfully enforced “shall” duty to stockholders.
Stockholders are the only corporate constituency with the franchise—inside
Delaware and outside it—and those potent rights have been used in recent decades
by aggressive institutions to put pressure on boards to put profit first, even if that hurts
other stakeholders.193 The exclusive franchise would be altered by a codetermination
scheme that provided statutory voting rights to workers. Indeed, the huge increase
in the power of institutional investors and the momentary desires of the stock market
over American companies, and a corresponding loss of clout for labor, has been an

See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (1986)
(consideration of non-stockholder constituencies must result in “rationally related benefit
accruing to the stockholders”).
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Id. (directors must seek to maximize price when the company is being sold and “the
object no longer is to protect or maintain the corporate enterprise”).
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See Lucian Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel & Roberto Tallarita, For Whom Corporate
Leaders Bargain, --- S. Cal. L. Rev. --- (forthcoming 2021); Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note
191

8.
For a critique co-authored by one of us, see William D. Savitt & Aneil Kovvali,
Stakeholder Governance in the Corporate Boardroom, 106 Cornell L. Rev. --- (forthcoming
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2021).

See Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed
Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware
General Corporation Law, 50 Wake Forest L. Rev. 761, 766 (2015).
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important driver of interest in the countervailing and rebalancing potential of board
codetermination.
A new model of governance in the U.S. is emerging that is more akin to the
models in Germany and Scandinavia. Under this model, exemplified by the
Delaware Public Benefit Corporation statute, the board has a mandatory “shall” duty
to treat all stakeholders with respect, even in a sale of the corporation. Although the
statute does not give voting rights to other stakeholders, it shifts some power within
the electorate to stockholders like socially responsible funds, index funds, and
pension funds, who can use the requirements of the statute to support the board in
pursuing a more sustainable, stakeholder-focused approach to generating profits. In
particular, the statute allows for the equivalent of civil suits by stockholders to force
the board to honor its obligation to stakeholders. Most of all, it imposes upon boards
the legal duty to protect stakeholders, and, thus, not just authorizes, but commands
them to protect stakeholders in important situations like mergers or an auction sale
of the corporation, and to make bidders agree to protections for workers,
communities, consumers, and the environment as a condition to being a bidder.
At this point, the choice of these models—Delaware for-profit corporation,
other states’ for-profit corporation, public benefit corporation—is left to the market.
If codetermination requirements were layered on top of them, worker directors
would be required to adapt their conduct to the model under which their corporation
operates. This would leave them with a great deal of flexibility to advance the
interests of workers on the board, just as stockholder-elected directors do for
stockholders. But under current law in Delaware and some other states, worker
directors at a for-profit corporation would have to be able to rationalize all their
actions on behalf of worker interests in a way that is consistent with stockholder
welfare. As we discuss below, a more basic reform requiring all socially important
companies to adopt, under state law, the public benefit corporation model would do
the most to alleviate concerns created by this requirement. 194
As fiduciaries, worker directors would also be expected to adhere to the same
standards of confidentiality that exist for other directors. Because of their special
interest in being an effective voice for the perspective of the company’s workforce,
worker directors would have a sincere interest in getting feedback from the workforce
on certain issues, and consulting with members of the workforce from time to time.
And if the worker directors are at a company that has a union, it would be natural for
the directors to wish to communicate with the union regularly. This understandable
dynamic poses some fiduciary issues that must be confronted. Just like directors
affiliated with a controlling stockholder that is another entity, or directors affiliated
with a private equity or hedge fund, worker directors will need to understand the
protocols expected of them, so that they can respect the company’s and financial
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See infra Part IV.A. This is consistent with Senator Warren’s proposal in the

Accountable Capitalism Act, which borrowed from the Delaware Public Benefit Corporation
statute. Accountable Capitalism Act § 5.
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markets’ legitimate need for confidentiality, while remaining capable of obtaining
information and discussing issues as needed for them to be effective.195
On a more positive front, to make the system serve its intended purpose
better, it could be useful to make clear that there are certain committees on which a
worker director must be a member, such as the compensation committee and any
other committee charged with overseeing company compensation and human
resources policies, and the nominating and corporate governance committee. For
board codetermination to work, worker directors must be on the key committees of
the board, and do the hard work of governing, so that they earn the respect of the
rest of the board and management, and so that the board pulls together to try to run
a profitable, successful company that treats its workers well while satisfying the
legitimate expectations of its stockholders for a sound return.
Worker directors’ involvement in disclosures will be important, and could be
achieved in numerous ways. Large public corporations might be obligated to obtain
the approval of worker directors on certain disclosures relevant to the best interests
of the workforce. 196 If board codetermination is to be successful, it will also be
necessary for worker directors to report directly to the workers on successes and
justify company decisions that workers consider unfavorable. 197 If the movement
toward greater and more informative EESG disclosure grows, it could aid in
informing all directors and workers, and create an accountability system that is more
robust and based on more reliable data.
IV.

TOWARD AN EFFECTIVE U.S. SYSTEM OF CODETERMINATION

With this context in mind, we close with a series of integrated policy
proposals that would facilitate the implementation of an effective and efficient system
of board codetermination. Our proposals are grounded in the realities we have
outlined, which underscore the differences between the American context and those
nations where full codetermination functions now.
In our view, to have the beneficial effects that policymakers like Senators
Baldwin, Sanders, and Warren want, a system of codetermination cannot be just topdown, but must have the ground-up features characteristic of the German and
Scandinavian systems. But progress takes time, and it will be challenging enough to
get a board level system of codetermination adopted by Congress, much less one that
mandates a corresponding requirement for establishment level works councils.

Cf. Summers, supra note 20 at 169 (“For Chrysler Corporation, in its period of crisis,
having on its board of directors a member of the Auto Workers probably creates no greater
conflict of loyalties than having on the board an officer of Chase Manhattan Corporation”).
195

Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a) (Sarbanes-Oxley provision requiring certification by
principal executive and financial officers).
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Summers, supra note 20 at 173, 176-77.
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For that reason, advocates of codetermination must create a foundation on
which a reasonably effective system of minimalist codetermination can stand, and
that creates the genuine potential for moving from minimalism to a more complete,
ground-up system that gives American workers more voice and leverage over the key
workplace issues that affect them.
The following proposals are advanced in that spirit, and are intended to work
in concert. In particular, they are designed to align corporate governance and labor
law policies toward environmentally responsible, sustainable growth, fair profits for
stockholders, and fair treatment of all stakeholders, and specifically workers.
Through that greater alignment, the common interests of corporate managers,
stockholders, and workers in promoting the sustained profitability of companies and
the fair treatment of all stakeholders will be emphasized, and conflicts will be
minimized and their fair reconciliation promoted. Perhaps most important, we
recognize that the history of management and labor conflict in the U.S. is deeply
ingrained, leading to mutual distrust that has to be confronted in any attempt to give
workers more voice, especially if those efforts involve company-created structures for
worker participation in companies where there is no union to represent workers.
Institutionally, the proposals also recognize our different system of
government, and the utility of building on, rather than attempting to upend, the
current allocation of responsibilities between the federal government and the states
in our corporate governance system. Not only is a system of codetermination more
likely to be adopted if it is evolutionary, it is more likely to function effectively if
responsibility is allocated in a way that aligns with the strengths and capacity of
different government bodies. To address these issues coherently, we advocate
consideration of these policy measures as part of any move toward codetermination.
Not only that, we believe that most of these measures should be adopted to improve
the fairness of our economic system to American workers regardless of whether
board codetermination itself is enacted as national policy.

A.

Adopt a Requirement for Stakeholder Governance for All Systemically
Important Companies Subject to the Board Codetermination Mandate

As we have explained, in the nations where codetermination is in place,
corporate law reduces the tension between worker directors and stockholder-elected
directors by requiring all directors to have respect for all stakeholders. 198 The U.S.
tradition is one that is more stockholder-centered, and in the leading state of
Delaware, action to favor other stakeholders has to have “some rationally related
benefit accruing to the stockholders.”199
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See supra Part II.D.
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But, in our view, the Public Benefit Corporation (“PBC”) model fits better
with codetermination. Under the PBC model, the corporation is expected to seek a
profit for its stockholders while treating all stakeholders, and society as a whole, with
respect.200 The model encourages corporations to identify a purpose and ways in
which it will benefit society and not just stockholders (hence, the focus on the public
benefit these corporations create).201 Rights are given to stockholders to enforce the
interests of stakeholders, and the board’s obligations to stakeholders extends to sales
of the corporation.202
A model of this kind is a better fit for a system of board codetermination.
Under the PBC model, all directors, however elected, have the same duty—to seek
profit and sustainable growth in a manner that is fair to all stakeholders and society.
Thus, under this system, worker directors face no more of a conflict than those
elected by stockholders. All directors have to endeavor to be fair to all stakeholders
and to resolve conflicts among them reasonably.
Senator Warren’s Accountable Capitalism Act recognized the fit between the
public benefit model and codetermination, and her bill contemplates all companies
required to implement codetermination to operate under standards drawn from the
Delaware PBC statute. But, her bill purports to require all large companies—those
with over a billion dollars in gross receipts in a taxable year—to have a federal charter
for this purpose, which would operate alongside its state charter.203
This is unnecessary and could be counterproductive. To the extent that the
federal government wishes to require certain socially important companies to adopt
governance of the kind set forth in the Delaware public benefit corporation statute,
there is a more traditional and efficient means to do so: Congress can require such
companies to opt-in to a qualifying state statute. By these means, a uniform federal
policy would be implemented, but in a manner that allows for efficient

8 Del. C. § 362(a) (A public benefit corporation is a “for-profit corporation” that
“shall be managed in a manner that balances the stockholders’ pecuniary interests, the best
interests of those materially affected by the corporation’s conduct, and the public benefit or
public benefits identified in its certificate of incorporation”).
200

Id. § 362(a)(1) (requiring public benefit corporations to provide a statement in its
certificate of incorporation indicating “one or more specific public benefits to be promoted
by the corporation”); id. § 362(b) (defining “Public benefit” to mean “a positive effect (or
reduction of negative effects) on 1 or more categories of persons, entities, communities or
interests (other than stockholders in their capacity as stockholders) including, but not limited
to, effects of an artistic, charitable, cultural, economic, educational, environmental, literary,
medical, religious, scientific or technological nature”).
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Id. § 367 (permitting shareholders meeting specific ownership thresholds to bring
suit to enforce directors’ duty to balance shareholder pecuniary interests against public
benefit). The Delaware statute does not permit non-shareholder constituencies to bring suit.
See id. § 365(b).
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implementation in a manner that recognizes the primacy of state law in determining
most issues of corporate governance, and leverages state-level institutions that
currently regulate and adjudicate most corporate governance issues.204 This would
also cohere with the federal-state approach we recommend for ensuring the integrity
of the board codetermination election process.
In our view, it would also make the most sense if worker directors were
elected to terms of no less than three years. This would provide an incentive for
them to invest in the information necessary to do their board duties well. Although
it would not be strictly necessary, a federal mandate for board-level codetermination
would best be advanced by a classified board for all directors, including those elected
by shareholders, so that only a third of the board is up for election each year. If the
focus is to be on sustainable growth, this method would best align governance with
intended outcomes, and given the potency of institutional investor power and
competitive product markets, it is difficult to see how this would immunize
companies from fair responsibility for generating sustainable profits for stockholders.

B.

Require Proper EESG Disclosure Requirements Addressing Stakeholder
Concerns

Moving toward the PBC model is not sufficient. The SEC must also be given
the mandate to require coherent EESG reporting by the companies covered by the
codetermination mandate. This would have utility in many respects, regardless of
whether codetermination or the PBC model is adopted, as for too long, the American
public has not received adequate information about how large companies treat their
workers, affect the environment and consumers, and affect society in other critically
important ways.205 In particular, it is long overdue for large private companies to have
the same responsibilities for EESG disclosures as public companies.206 For purposes
of this Article, we simply note that requiring companies to disclose solid information
about their EESG goals, policies and outcomes would create an accountability
structure for them that is more aligned with sustainable, socially responsible growth.
And importantly, this information would help worker directors do their job, as they
would have not just information about their own companies’ workforce metrics, but
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See id.

See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., Kirby M. Smith & Reilly S. Steel, Caremark and ESG,
Perfect Together: A Practical Approach to Implementing an Integrated, Efficient, and
Effective Caremark and EESG Strategy, --- Iowa L. Rev. --- (forthcoming 2021) (describing
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coherent approach to generating, reporting, and constructively using information on
employee, environmental, social, and governance issues); Ann M. Lipton, Not Everything Is
About Investors: The Case for Mandatory Stakeholder Disclosure, 37 Yale J. on Reg. 499
(2020) (urging conscious attention to the fact that many stakeholders rely upon disclosures
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the ability to compare their company to other industry competitors and to identify
best practices and areas for further study.

C.

Turn the Compensation Committee into a Full Workforce Committee and
Increase the Importance of the Board’s Role in Issues Important to Workers

Because American worker directors will not have the supportive information
base that comes from works councils and strong unions, there is, as we have noted,
a greater need to make sure they have adequate information and leverage to ensure
that corporate boards give greater consideration to the needs of company workers.
At present, corporate boards spend little time considering the interests of employees
other than the top of top management. Compensation committees concentrate their
time on the C-Suite and the board itself, and typically do not even have oversight
responsibility for key human resources compliance areas like worker safety, Title
VII, and broader issues of equity and inclusion. Nor do they typically address critical
issues like the company’s attitude toward unions, living wages, or the treatment of
contracted workers in its supply chain.
Sadly, since compensation committees have been mandated, C-Suite
compensation and payouts to stockholders have soared, while workers’ share of the
profits they have created has plummeted.207 To redress this situation and to give real
voice to the worker directors, the compensation committee should be reconceived
as one responsible for overseeing the company’s overall compensation policies—as a
workforce committee—and not just those applying to top executives. Rather than the
unbusinesslike obsession with just a handful of managers, the compensation
committee should ensure that the company has a pay strategy that fairly rewards all
levels of employees and that harnesses their importance to the company’s bottom

Lawrence Mishel & Jordi Kandra, CEO Compensation Surged 14% in 2019 to
$21.3 million, Econ. Pol’y Inst. (Aug. 18, 2020) (“From 1978 to 2019, CEO pay based on
realized compensation grew by 1,167%, far outstripping the S&P stock market growth [741%]
and top 0.1% earnings growth [which was 337% between 1978 and 2018, the latest data year
available]. In contrast, compensation of the typical worker grew by just 13.7% from 1978 to
2019); Alyssa Davis & Lawrence Mishel, CEO Pay Continues to Rise as Typical Workers
Are Paid Less, Econ. Pol’y Inst. (June 12, 2014). Consideration of broad-based
compensation is not a subject foreign to public company compensation committees.
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Compensation Committee Guide 7-8 (Feb. 2020),
https://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/ClientMemos/WLRK/WLRK.26789.20.pdf
(“Companies should consider whether the compensation committee will have responsibility
for employee compensation beyond that of executive offices. . . . [C]ompanies should be
mindful that due to increased focus on pay ratios and shareholder litigation surrounding
compensation issues generally, it may be useful for compensation committees to increase
their oversight of total compensation expenditures.”). Indeed, some compensation
committees currently oversee incentive and ERISA plans for all employees. Id. at 7, 21-31.
Expanding the scope of the mandate would not require an undue stretch of current
committee members’ competencies.
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line by motivating them to be more productive. The committee should situate top
executive pay within an overall strategy to encourage good performance and ensure
fair compensation to all company workers. Importantly, this would require the
committee, and then the full board, to approve the company’s policy about its attitude
toward unions and regionally appropriate living wages, and even the ability to
determine whether and to what extent the company will require its contractors to
adhere to the standards it sets for itself.
Pertinent to our topic, the committee’s remit would not be limited to U.S.
workers, but the company’s entire workforce. By this means, there would be boardlevel attention to the need for companies to treat all their workers with fairness and
respect. This would ease some of the tension of a system giving only American
workers the right to vote for directors.
Importantly, the workforce committee should also have first-level
responsibility to oversee company policies addressing essential issues like racial and
gender discrimination and inclusion, pay equity, and the assurance of a tolerant,
harassment-free workplace. Most American companies lack a committee that
focuses on all these critical issues relevant to workforce fairness and productivity, and
often heap these issues on the plate of already over-burdened audit committees.208
To this same point of rational board attention to workforce issues, the workforce
committee should also assure that key safety issues for workers are attended to by a
board committee with expertise and focus relevant to the company’s specific
business, and not just loaded to audit’s burden. Notably, the workforce committee
should also be the one that, as to EESG metrics relevant to the workforce, helps
develop those metrics with management and monitors management’s
implementation of them. If, as advocated, mandatory EESG disclosure is required
by federal law, this committee should review and approve disclosures involving
employees.
Means like this would minimize the problems that board codetermination
would face in the U.S. For starters, a mandate of this kind would give the board a
greater say in policies important to workers, and thus provide a basis for the
involvement of the worker directors in their development and in the oversight of their
implementation. And, it would make sense to require that at least one worker
director serves on the workforce. The requirement for a board committee to exist
to oversee these key employee policies would serve as a partial substitute for the
ground-up mechanism of works councils by giving worker directors access to
information and an opportunity to shape policies most important to workers. Finally,
a workforce committee would ensure a regular flow of information to the board about

See, e.g., Kristen Sullivan, Maureen Bujno & Leeann Galezio Arthur, Defining the
Role of the Audit Committee in Overseeing ESG, Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate
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Governance (Dec. 4, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/12/04/defining-the-roleof-the-audit-committee-in-overseeing-esg/.
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workforce issues, and thus help all directors to play their intended roles more
effectively.209

D.

Use the Board’s Workforce Committee as a Trustworthy Foundation to
Experiment with Greater Worker Voice.

One of the most vexing problems for American workers now is the binary
divide that exists about worker voice. If you are in a company and part of a unionrepresented bargaining unit, you have representatives who advocate for you. But
private sector union density is less than ten percent now.210 And at companies without
unions, there is very little voice for workers.211 For one thing, American companies
have traditionally opposed unions, and companies with an anti-union mindset might
also tend not to want to hear from the workforce in any assertive form that threatens
top management’s view of things. For another, the anti-union history of American
capitalism led to provisions in the NLRA that prohibit companies from interfering
with or dominating a union.212 Labor unions remain concerned that if companies are
authorized to create vehicles for worker voice and participation akin to works
councils and employee representation, they will do so not to help workers but as a
method to control them and to discourage them from joining a union.213

209

The workforce committee mandate could be adopted in one of two ways. It could
of course be adopted by Congress. But it could also be done by private ordering through
stock exchange leadership, which could mandate the workforce committee structure could
be implemented as an exchange requirement similar to what Nasdaq has recently done with
diversity and inclusion requirements. See Nasdaq to Advance Diversity through New
Proposed Listing Requirements, Press Releases, NASDAQ (Dec. 1, 2020),
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As of January 21, 2021, the union membership rate of private-sector workers was
6.3%. Union Members Summary, Economic News Release, U.S. Bureau of Lab. Stat. (Jan.
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For American workers, these political dynamics have not worked out well.
When many businesses do not favor greater worker voice (especially if mandated by
government) and when the labor movement is suspicious of company-sponsored
forums for worker input,214 it is not surprising that nothing has been done to amplify
the voice of workers at non-union workplaces. Policy ideas were toyed with during
the 1990s, 215 but not adopted. The consequences have not been suffered by top
executives; instead, it is American workers who have found themselves more and
more powerless as union prevalence has continued to drop, and American
companies have been put under more pressure to squeeze workers in response to
the demands of powerful institutional investors.
For that reason, the benefit-to-cost ratio for the American labor movement
of experimenting with greater worker voice outside the union context has increased.
Polls show more interest by younger workers in having a say and in unions
themselves.216 If more workers have an experience in constructive input on issues
affecting their workplace, they may develop a desire to move toward union
membership. And worker voice at more companies may put upward pressure on
pay and other policies unions care about, thus creating more leverage for the union
movement itself to get policy changes it seeks.
The workforce committee could be the fulcrum for change in this direction.
If, by way of example, the workforce committee had to be comprised solely of
independent directors and include at least one worker director, its legitimacy to the

Bus. Law. 177, 181 (1973). Professor Summers shared this sentiment: “[Employee
representation] has not been greeted with enthusiasm by either unions or employers. On the
contrary, suggestions or proposals for employee representation on corporate boards has
been rejected out of hand.” Summers, supra note 20 at 155.
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This is not a new development. AFL-CIO Secretary-Treasurer Lane Kirkland once
insisted that the American worker “is smart enough to know, in his bones, that salvation lies—
not in the reshuffling of chairs in the board room or in the executive suite—but in the growing
strength and bargaining power of his own autonomous organizations.” Martin Lipton,
Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 45 n.199
(1987) (providing quote and collecting other sources).
Dan Clawson & Mary Ann Clawson, What Has Happened to the U.S. Labor
Movement? Union Decline and Renewal, 25 Ann. Rev. of Soc. 95, 95-119 (1999) (describing
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proposed labor reform efforts of the 1990s, few of which were adopted).
Christine Ro, Could Young Workers Change the Future of Labour?, The Life
Project, BBC (Dec. 7, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/worklife/article/20201203-could-youngworkers-reshape-labour-unions (“[A]s working lives have become increasingly unpredictable
and jobs less stable . . . [s]ome labour experts say the pandemic could open the door to more
demands from young workers. . . . [A]lthough [young people] may not have been joining
traditional unions, that doesn’t mean young workers have been shunning the idea of
organizing altogether. Some have just been doing it their way, in a trend that began before
the pandemic but has since gained new resonance.”).
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union movement and workers might be enhanced. If the statutory mandate of the
committee was clear and encompassed a duty to facilitate worker voice in a manner
that would not circumvent or undermine the ability of workers to unionize, then
perhaps the committees could be authorized to experiment with works councils to
address the kind of issues they cover in the EU. More modestly but still usefully,
these committees could be encouraged to regularly survey the sentiments of workers,
oversee forums at which workers could be heard, and ensure that there are
protections from retribution against workers who participate.
The workforce committee would, in this model, become a center of
accountability. At companies that did not treat workers well, the members of the
committee would have to bear the heat now applied only to management.217 And the
requirement for worker director membership, and greater full board involvement in
workforce issues, will give the worker directors more clout.
Experimentation of this kind might lead to converging best practices that
eventually make the implementation of a system of ground-up worker voice at all
large companies feasible.

E.

Restore the Promise of the New Deal to American Workers through Labor
Law Reform

Putting worker directors on boards cannot be expected to help American
workers unless the promise of equity toward workers exemplified by the New Deal
is restored. Much has been written on this topic, but for present purposes we focus
on five key issues.
First, given the vital importance of unions to making any system of
codetermination work, the NLRA must be updated so that its protections for workers
function in a 21st century economy. Union density is important because trade unions
and their staffs advocate for workers in ways that benefit not just union members, but
all workers. All American workers benefit now from the policy advocacy done by
the American labor movement, and further reductions in private sector union
representation bode ill for efforts to reverse wage stagnation and growing inequality.
Unions also have staffs who are expert in relevant issues that worker directors will
have to confront, and can act as a potential source for high-quality director education.
Yet for over two generations, corporations and Republican administrations have
worked to undermine the NLRA and the entity supposed to enforce it, the NLRB.218
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In such a system, proxy advisors might even incorporate more deeply these issues
into their metrics and review of board members, basing support of the chair of the workforce
committee, for instance, partially on the fair treatment of employees.

See, e.g., Hiba Hafiz, Structural Labor Rights, --- Mich. L. Rev. --- (forthcoming
2021) (“employer lobbying and formalist interpretations of the NLRA have driven labor law
from its original purpose”); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Development on a Cracked Foundation: How
the Incomplete Nature of New Deal Labor Reform Presaged its Ultimate Decline, 57 Harv.
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For American workers, the passage of legislation, such as the Pro-Act,219 to
reverse this tendency may be a more urgent priority than minimalist codetermination.
And absent reform like the Pro-Act, codetermination is likely to be hollow, as the
infrastructure necessary to make it effective will continue to be undermined.220
Second, to make worker directors effective, there must be some minimal
level playing field. The natural forces of competition will generate pressures for
companies to shortchange workers to get an advantage. A minimum wage that has
some realistic approximation to a living wage is helpful to avoiding arbitrage of this
kind against workers. For over a decade, the real value of the federal minimum wage
has eroded, contributing to inequality and economic insecurity. 221 A system of
codetermination will be much more effective if there is a decent floor under wages
that makes sure that the starting level for bargaining and wage-setting occurs at a
humane level that promotes greater social equity and fairness. Absent such a floor,
worker directors are likely to have less ability to restore the fairer gainsharing that
characterized the U.S. economy in the decades before 1980.
Third, likewise, sectoral bargaining would help reduce incentives to make
profits at the expense of workers.222 By this means, companies within industry sectors
would be encouraged to compete by innovating and serving customers well, and not
by reducing wages. Sectoral bargaining is predominant in the nations with effective
systems of codetermination, and aligns interests in a way favorable to greater
economic security and equality. President Biden has expressed serious interest in

J. on Leg. 67, 83-84 (2020) (discussing conservative legal trends beginning in the Nixon era
that undermined the NLRA regime); Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 216 Yale L.J. 2,
21-25 (2016) (describing pattern of deregulation and the NLRB’s loss of effectiveness).
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Protecting the Right to Organize Act of 2019, H.R. 2474, 116th Cong. (2020).
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A robust labor movement would also facilitate other measures to encourage
experimentation with codetermination. Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA prevents employers
from “dominat[ing] or interfer[ing]” with labor organizations. Although the intent of the
provision was to prevent the creation of stooge or puppet unions, it has been understood to
prohibit experimentation with works council structures. If unions were more robust, the
provision could be relaxed more easily.
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See, e.g., Drew Desilver, 5 facts about the minimum wage, Pew Research Center

(Jan. 4, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/01/04/5-facts-about-theminimum-wage/ (federal minimum wage has been $7.25 since 2009, and that the inflationadjusted minimum wage peaked in 1968).
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throughout Europe, better serves labor law’s goal of increasing workers’ bargaining power so
as to reduce economic and political inequality”).
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sectoral bargaining, and the adoption of it would make a minimalist approach to
codetermination much more effective in achieving its desired ends.223
Fourth, the original sin of the New Deal must be corrected by addressing
stark racial inequities. By design, Black Americans, were denied the full benefits of
the New Deal’s effect in giving opportunities to gain wealth and join the middle
class.224 This original problem was compounded by the reversal of fair gainsharing
with workers in the last forty years, because Black Americans are more likely to be
in the working and lower middle classes and to need good wages to help them build
some wealth and put their children through college. The increased take at the top at
the expense of workers thus had a particularly negative effect on Black Americans.
Beyond correcting a serious injustice, a program to address racial inequality by lifting
the wages of workers and investing in poor communities would help all struggling
workers, regardless of background. Economic insecurity makes it easy for
demagogues to exploit the fears of all workers and seek to divide workers along racial
and ethnic lines. A 21st Century New Deal that boosts the well-being and prospects
for all working Americans will mend our nation’s frayed social fabric and strengthen
our long-term productivity.
Finally, the international perspective cannot be ignored. If the U.S. is to
move toward minimalist codetermination, it should simultaneously support the
inclusion of much stronger labor protections in the international trading system. This
was the original goal of FDR and the Allies,225 but was not adopted, in part because
an era of Western hegemony produced prosperity for American and European
workers that reduced the pressure to do so. But the globalization of markets without
corresponding protections for workers has resulted in growing inequality through the
OECD, and has put downward pressure on the leverage of workers in all OECD
nations. Embedding support for labor in international trade law will promote
convergence in a regionally appropriate way around key shared values like the right
to join a union, the right to a safe workplace, the right to a minimum wage, reasonable
hours, and the elimination of child labor. It would also promote the adoption of
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The Havana Charter exemplifies the desired goals that never came to fruition.
William H. Meyer, Testing Theories of Labor Rights and Development, 37 Hum. Rts. Q.
414, 416-17 (2015) (quoting Article 7 of the Havana Charter and discussing the charter’s lack
of support in Congress); see also Leo E. Strine, Jr., Made for This Moment: The Enduring
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policies, like codetermination, that give workers more leverage and voice, by reducing
the ability of companies and nations to seek advantage by undercutting the
protections afforded to workers in nations like Germany, which place a high value
on workers’ rights.

F.

Align the Interests of Human Investors in Fair and Sustainable Capitalism
with Corresponding Duties for Institutional Investors

As we have discussed, codetermination will function effectively if companies
are expected to seek profit in a manner that is fair to all their stakeholders, than if
they must function in a way that elevates pleasing stockholders above all other values.
That is important given the potent power given to American stockholders under
American corporate law, and that no one is proposing that worker directors
comprise even half the board. This power has been enhanced by tax subsidies given
to the money management business that force Americans saving for retirement to
hand their funds over to mutual funds, who then have the power to control that
capital, and vote the shares acquired with it.226 This “separation of ownership from
ownership” has led to a concentration of voting power in mutual funds, and to the
emergence of activist funds.227 Taken as a whole, institutional investors have pushed
for companies to inflate stock prices, pay out more to stockholders, reduce labor
costs and cut reserves, and to generally manage themselves to please the momentary
concerns of the stock market. The growing power of these institutions and declining
leverage of workers is thought by many to explain much of the growth in inequality
in our economy.228
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In other work, one of us has described in detail the practical effect of the decline of
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Retaining Shareholder Voice, 99 Boston U. L. Rev. 1001 (2019).
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This shift in distribution helps a narrow sliver of Americans and hurts the
rest. For 99% of Americans, most of their wealth, including what they get to save for
retirement, comes from their continued access to a job.229 Stock ownership remains
concentrated among the wealthier in society,230 and that distribution will not change
unless fair gainsharing with workers in terms of higher pay is restored, so that more
Americans can become part of the investor class.
Not only that, ordinary Americans who invest pay taxes, breathe air and drink
water, consume products, and need portfolio growth that is sustainable and there for
them to pay for their kids’ college tuition and their own retirement. They do not
need bubble capitalism, they need fundamentally sound, sustainable growth.
Because these Americans own portfolios tracking the whole economy and because
they as taxpayers and citizens bear the costs of externalities, their economic needs
require a focus on sustainable, socially responsible growth that facilitates the most
long-term productive development of our economy.
But American institutional investors have motivations that are at odds with
these goals. Unless those motivations are addressed, and institutional investors
required to adopt voting policies that take into account the interests of their investors
in fair treatment of workers, consumers, and the environment, codetermination
cannot function effectively. The power of stockholders is too considerable and
therefore must be channeled toward fair and sustainable growth.
That means two things. First, all institutional investors must be free to take
into account key EESG factors like fair treatment of workers and environmental
responsibility. And certain institutional investors—socially responsible mutual funds,
index funds, pension and retirement funds—should be required to do so given the
long-term interests of their investors. This will give the stockholder-elected boards
more electoral input that takes into account the responsibilities companies have to
their workers, stakeholders, and society.
Second, all institutional investors should have to disclose how they factor
EESG considerations into their stewardship policies. It is not enough to, as we
support, require socially important companies to disclose their EESG policies and
metrics tracking their accomplishment of their EESG goals. Unless the institutional
investors to which stockholder-elected directors must respond also have to take the
interests of workers, consumers, communities, the environment, and society as a
whole seriously in their stewardship, it is not realistic to think that the companies they
ultimately control will do so.

See Strine, Who Bleeds?, supra note 231 at 1876-77 (“[M]ost Americans owe
almost all of their wealth to their ability to hold a job and to secure gains in wages. This is
not simply true among the poorer half of Americans; it is true of 99% of Americans. . . .
[T]hose in the ninety-fifth to ninety-ninth percentiles still get over 60% [of their income] from
their labor.”).
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Put simply, an effective system of codetermination requires that not just
corporate management, but institutional investors have the obligation to support a
socially responsible approach to capitalism.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, we have demonstrated the substantial distance that exists
between the American context and that which exists in nations with effective systems
of codetermination that promote fair treatment of workers. Advocates who believe
codetermination can help American workers cannot avoid grappling with how to
bridge that gap, because without doing so, an effective system of codetermination
cannot be implemented in the United States. As people who share the goal of
restoring fair gainsharing with American workers and amplifying their voice, we have
endeavored to examine the key obstacles to codetermination operating in a
meaningfully beneficial way in the U.S. To that end, we offer a series of policy
measures that, if adopted even without a move toward codetermination, would be of
value to American workers and orient our economy toward socially responsible,
sustainable growth. Even more, we show how the adoption of these supportive
policies could make a minimal system of board codetermination serve its intended
positive purpose, and create the potential for a future move toward a comprehensive
system of codetermination benefiting American workers.

